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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I argue that we, the adherents of law and economics,' have
for too long ignored the analytical importance of culture2 to our field of
study. Perhaps the most poignant testimony to this disregard of culture3 has
been the persistent absence of a systematic framework that incorporates
culture into law and economic analysis. Such a framework, if posited, would
have two goals. First, it would serve at an intimate level to extend an
analytical hand and give a voice to those of us who find cultural bias to be
concomitant with certain aspects of law and economic analysis.4 Second, at
1. The standard definition of law and economics is: the application of economic analysis principles
to the study of law. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW at xix, 21 (4th ed.
1992). I have argued elsewhere, however, that "the substance of L&Ec [law and economics] primarily
involves using legal objects as a translating medium-a means by which principles and assumptions of
economic analysis are translated into principles and assumptions of L&Ec. These principles and
assumptions are in turn used to explain, critique, and make predictions regarding legal objects." Linz
Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics, and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance:
A Tentative Casefor Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1017, 1038 (1992). For some
useful citations to introductory books in the field, see id. n.80.
2. Law and economics has been in existence for at least the past 100 years, if not longer. See
POSNER, supra note I, at 21, 22 and references cited therein. What one will not find in either of the
introductory works cited in note 1 is a discussion of a kind of law and economic analysis that depends
on the culture of the analyst. Of course, this may not be so much the fault of law and economics as the
fault of economic analysis itself. It is conceivable that some economists might perceive the recognition
of the importance of culture to their analysis as a loss of positivism. See infra note 132 and
accompanying text. The one major exception to this perception is a movement in economic analysis
called "institutionalism." See infra note 356 and accompanying text. There are also some economists
who have begun to argue that the culture of the analyst plays a role in the economic analysis that
results. See, eg., TESSA MORRIs-SuzuKI, A HISTORY OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT 1-6 (1989).
A nascent movement within the philosophy of the social sciences seeks a "realist" social science that
takes into account the fact that the strict logical positivist model, see infra note 130 and accompanying
text, is not followed in any science, natural or social. This approach to the social sciences has been
applied to psychology. One of the goals of this Article is to make inroads into a realist economic
science. See infra text following note 15 for details of this Article's three other goals. For a discussion
of realist philosophy of science, see PETER T. MANICAS, A HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 241-65 (1987).
3. Let me emphasize that this Article is original in suggesting that law and economics scholars
should have higher explicit analytical regard for culture. Critical Race Theorists have argued for some
time that the academy should have higher analytical regard for culture in general. See, e.g., Gerald
Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1043 (1988).
4. Demonstrating the nature of the cultural bias is, of course, one of the major objectives of the
framework proposed here. Part II discusses how this might be done, and gives an illustration. There is
little question but that the perception "out there" is that law and economics is an analytical framework
that is compatible with the project of racial oppression. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final
Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REv. 597 (1991) (discussing the triumph of law and economic analysis in
passing a "Racial Preference Licensing Act of 1996" which requires whites to pay for the right to
discriminate). In the rest of that article and others, e.g., Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its
Legal Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 VILL. L. REv. 767 (1988), Bell discusses the costs of
discrimination from the perspective of one who has experienced it, an action that qualifies as Critical
Cultural Law & Economics ("CCL&Ec"). It would be better CCL&Ec, however, for Bell to show the
economic analytical difficulties with the preference statute. Notwithstanding, I should point out that it
may be axiomatic to say that Derrick Bell has been an inspiration to virtually all of us who write in the
interstice of race and the law. A brilliant recent piece that pays homage to Bell, and also qualifies as
CCL&Ec, is Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1993). Harris' implicit
discussion of the "white cartel" is taken up explicitly in Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31
1995]
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a disciplinary level the framework would increase the power of law and
economics by expanding its descriptive accuracy, generalizability, and
credibility.
The primary purpose of this Article is to posit just such a framework. I have
chosen to call this framework "Critical Cultural Law and Economics"
("CCL&Ec"). There are two branches of CCL&Ec which correspond to the
two goals of the framework identified above, In order to explore the
difference between the two branches, one must begin with a provisional
definition of a culture as a group of individuals who share certain common
meanings.' To illustrate: cows have a different meaning to Hindus than to
non-Hindus.6 To say that the Hindu culture is different from another culture
is to say not only that there might be different things and experiences between
the two cultures, but also that similar things and experiences might have
different meanings within each culture.
This Article extends the idea of culture to define a culture of deindividuali-
zation.7 I posit that deindividualization exists where society attributes
psychological characteristics to someone on the basis of their immutable and
apparent physical characteristics. Arguably, we are all members of this
culture, which is represented by Figure 1, below. The culture of deindividuali-
zation encompasses the two subcultures of beneficial and detrimental
deindividualization, which are distinguished by the nature of the beneficial or
detrimental effect exerted upon the individual by deindividualization. Because
sub-subcultures provide the most concrete illustrations of the culture,8 one
can imagine sub-subcultures of race and gender within each of the subcultures
of deindividualization.9
Although this intellectual scheme is pressed into service throughout this
Article, it has a value independent of the Article. For example, it can be used
to argue that one can be a member of the black sub-subculture without being
a member of the African-American subculture, and vice versa.'"
As another example, one of the major paradoxes of feminist thought" is
parallel to a paradox in black thought because both spring from the same
source: the paradox of deindividualization. The substance of the paradox of
SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 133, 153-57 (1994), and Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
1995) (manuscript at 21-43, on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
5. Culture is defined more fully in Part I.A.
6. Cf WILLIAM A. HAVILAND, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 425 (1978).
7. See infra part I.C.
8. Cultural principles (e.g., deindividualization) become more concrete or contextualized as the
cultural experience becomes more particular or unique. See infra text accompanying note 61.
9. The point here is that race or gender becomes the basis for deindividualization, be it beneficial
(e.g., white and/or male) or detrimental (e.g., black and/or female). For a more in-depth discussion, see
infra note 79 and accompanying text.
10. Throughout this Article, I use the black race for illustrative purposes. This is because I am more
familiar with the literature that deals with blacks, and I am able to write from personal experience on
some matters. By using the black race by way of example, it is not my intention to exclude other
minority groups from the afialytical implications of this Article.
11. For a discussion of this paradox, see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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deindividualization is that those who have been detrimentally deindividualized
must rely on their deindividualization in order to destroy it. The paradox
inheres in the fact that in so relying, the deindividualized become unwitting
participants in the perpetuation of the very deindividualization they seek to
destroy. Using blacks once again as an example, the paradox of deindividuali-
zation becomes the paradox of blackness. The paradox is that we blacks must
unite on the basis of our blackness, relying on a mythical construct of the
"black race," treating one another as if we are alike, in order to oppose those
who treat us that way. The proposition that we are not alike, that the cbnstruct
of a black (or white or whatever) race is a completely socially constructed
myth (the theory of non-race) is also discussed below. 2
In this Article I discuss CCL&Ec against this backdrop about the nature of
culture. Accordingly, in the first branch of Critical Cultural Law and
Economics-Culture ("CCL&Ec-C"), culture informs law and economics. The
first goal discussed above, the enfranchisement of different cultural perspec-
tives (i.e., different things and experiences or different meanings for the same
things and experiences), is met with this branch. The critique here is chiefly
a methodological one. In this Article I argue that law and economics can
benefit from a little informed feeling and sensing ("phenomenology"),
especially when data are vague and entrenched cultural and ideological biases
exist. 3
To illustrate, assume for the moment that white or male sub-subcultural
perspectives dominate much of law and economics today. Such domination,
by definition, will occasionally motivate a resistance, either intentional or
unintentional, to perspectives that are inconsistent with the white or male sub-
subcultural perspectives.
My reference to perspectives and not cultural membership in the prior
paragraph is not accidental. That is, the overlap between being a member of
a culture and possessing the perspective of that culture is a sizeable, but less
than complete, overlap. For example, someone who is white or male could
learn the perspective of those who are detrimentally deindividualized in our
society. Membership in a sub-subculture of deindividualization is generally a
sufficient but not necessary condition for having that perspective. 4
12. The point here is that we are all members of the prison-house of the myth of race. Specifically,
we have all been socially conditioned to see skin color as the relevant defining variable (e.g., as opposed
to ear lobe size). This is known in cultural anthropology as the theory of non-race. I take the analysis
a step further and propose a radical theory of non-race which asserts that the very concept of race is
itself racist since it invariably leads to the arbitrary categorization of individuals on the basis of
immutable and apparent physical characteristics, and ultimately to psychological attribution on the basis
of those characteristics. For a fuller discussion, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
14. Yet even here I hedge. For example, it is conceivable that there are individuals in America who
have the physical characteristics that we define as "black" but do not experience racism. The rule in
anthropology studies is that if more than 70% of the members of the subculture share a common
experience, it is considered a subcultural experience. See, e.g., Richard W. Brislin, Applied Cross-
Cultural Psychology: An Introduction, in APPLIED CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 9, 13 (Richard W.
Brislin ed., 1990) (arguing that the determination of a subcultural value or experience is a statistical
matter).
1995]
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CCL&Ec-C provides a methodology, essentially the methodology of cultural
anthropology, to promote the influence of alternative cultural perspectives on
law and economic analysis. Anthropologists developed this methodology to
better enable themselves to learn about other cultures. The methodology is
particularly useful when law and economics is being used to analyze a
problem that spans or is completely situated within a subculture which is not
the analyst's own. A critique of the law and economic analysis is possible
whenever the methodology has not been followed.
In thZ second branch of CCL&Ec-Critical Cultural Law and Economics-
Law and Economics ("CCL&Ec-L")-law and economics informs culture.
Consistent with the second analytic goal discussed above, this version
celebrates the universality of law and economics by affirming the power of
economic analysis to provide insight into the legal or law-related problems of
nondominant subcultures or, for that matter, entirely different cultures. Here,
the methodology of CCL&Ec-L is essentially the methodology of law and
economics (e.g., abstraction and reduction). However, this methodology is
applied to legal or law-related problems that are outside the domain of the
dominant subculture. The objective is to have a legal story, to tell a cultural
story about the legal story, and then to tell an economic story about the
cultural story of the legal story. 5
Hopefully, by now the reader understands that, in the analysis of any given
cultural problem, law and economics simultaneously informs and becomes
informed by culture. Put differently, CCL&Ec-C and CCL&Ec-L are simul-
taneously occurring phenomena that will be bifurcated only for purposes of
this Article. Figure 4, below, reflects this process of simultaneous occurrence.
This Article, therefore, contains three embedded agendas. The first and
primary agenda is that of announcing and defining a CCL&Ec framework. In
fulfilling this first agenda, I will pursue a second agenda: to posit the
existence of a culture of deindividualization. In fulfilling this second agenda,
I will pursue a third: to make the case for a radical theory of non-race.
In view of this synopsis, the remainder of this Article will be organized as
follows. Part I will be committed to culture: defining it and characterizing its
structure and processes. Part II will discuss the methodology of CCL&Ec-C
and apply that methodology to the debate on the law and economics of racial
discrimination. Part III will discuss the methodology of CCL&Ec-L and apply
that methodology to the Kennedy/Bell debate over the success of Critical Race
Theory. The CCL&Ec framework having been presented, Part IV will show
how the two branches of CCL&Ec relate to one another, comparing CCL&Ec
The converse of the preceding point is also true. That is, there are individuals who either do not have
.the physical characteristics that we identify as black or have never personally experienced racism, but
are able to articulate with amazing clarity the perspective of those who have experienced racism. I have
received the permission of my colleague Richard McAdams to cite him as an illustration of this
phenomenon. Consider his assessment of hiring the "perfect black": "For the bulk of society, it is
sufficiently subtle merely to refrain from overt reliance on skin color alone. For example, a white
employer may consider hiring a black worker if, but only if, she stands in stark contrast to all the
stereotypes the employer holds of blacks." McAdams, supra note 4, (manuscript at 92 n.254).
15. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
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to other critical movements in the law and to other efforts to show the
relevance of culture to law and economics.
I. THE NATURE OF CULTURES AND SUBCULTURES
4. A Definition of Culture
In the not too distant past, the word "culture" was subject to many different
definitions by cultural anthropologists. 6 A casual survey of more recent
literature, however, reveals that anthropologists have reached some consensus
on a definition of culture. 7 In this portion of the Article, the example that
will be relied on is the idea of America and that idea's external representation
(e.g., a piece of cloth with red and white bars, stars, etc.).
Culture can be defined as (a) "meanings" that (b) "people create, and...
create people, as members of societies."' 8 Part (a) necessarily refers to the
16. Anthropology can be divided into two branches: physical and social (or cultural). Physical
anthropology is concerned with humans as biological creatures; it draws on genetic and biological
sciences to explain human evolution and variation. HAvILAND, supra note 6, at 8. Social anthropology,
on the other hand, is more concerned with the study of humans as social animals. Id. at 8-9. It
encompasses archeology, the study of cultural processes, cross-cultural analysis, and social and cultural
systematics. Fred W. Voget, The History of Cultural Anthropology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 1-3 (John J. Honigmann ed., 1973). A fine distinction has been made
between social and cultural anthropology, which is associated with the restriction of the concept of
culture to ideational or cognitive entities. Marvin Harris, History and Ideological Significance of the
Separation of Social and Cultural Anthropology, in BEYOND THE MYTHS OF CULTURE 391, 391-405
(Eric B. Ross ed., 1980).
E.B. Tylor was the first anthropologist to define culture, which he represented as a "complex whole
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society." EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE: RESEARCHES INTO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MYTHOLOGY, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, ART AND CUSTOM I (2d ed. 1974). This
definition was given widespread currency by anthropologists of the time. See Voget, supra, at 2. But
see Marshall Durbin, Cognitive Anthropology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY, supra, at 447,449-50 (discussing 10 different definitions of culture by cultural anthropologists).
See generally MORRIS FRELiCH, Is Culture Still Relevant?, in THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 1, 1-26
(Morris Freilich ed., 1989) (arguing that definitions of culture should reach beyond empty tags and
labels to touch the humanity represented); DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE 5-23
(1979) (sorting through various definitions of the term "culture"); Robert H. Winthrop, Introduction:
Culture and the Anthropological Tradition, in CULTURE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 1, 1-
13 (Robert H. Winthrop ed., 1990) (noting that anthropology's multiple and conflicting definitions of
"culture" are notorious).
17. See, e.g., ROBERT A. HINDE, INDIVIDUALS, RELATIONSHIPS AND CULTURE 4 n.2 (1987); AARON
PODOLEFSKY & PETER J. BROWN, APPLYING CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 2 (1991); JAMES P. SPRADLEY,
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 8 (1980).
18. ULF HANNERZ, CULTURAL COMPLEXITY: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF MEANING
3 (1992). The notion that culture is meaning can be found in the work of other recent authors. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Analytic Debates: Understanding the Relative Autonomy of Culture, in CULTURE
& SOCIETY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 1-2 (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 1990);
Friedrich H. Tenbruck, The Cultural Foundations of Society, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE 20
(Hans Haferkamp ed., 1989). There is by no means complete unanimity on this definition of culture.
See, e.g., J. Zvi NAMENwiRTH & ROBERT P. WEBER, DYNAMICS OF CULTURE 8, 16,(1987) (relying on
the idea of culture as meaning, while simultaneously relying on the old definition of culture as a plan
or design for living); Voget, supra note 16, at 3.
The definition of culture given in the text does not make clear the various approaches to culture that
operate simultaneously within cultural anthropology. Although these approaches study different
dimensions of culture, at times they overlap. It is useful to pause here to explicitly identify five of these
approaches. Brief mention will also be made of three approaches to culture that are outside of cultural
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meanings of things. Those things can be internal, such as "ideas ... concepts,
propositions, [and] values"' 9 that people carry around in their minds, as well
as the ways in which their minds work."0 The idea of America is an example.
Things that have meaning can also be external things defined as "the different
ways in which meaning is made accessible to the senses, made public."',
The American flag is an example. The process of imputing the meaning of an
internal thing upon an external thing is called "externalization."2 2 All
external things that are meaningful in effect represent the externalization of
some internal meaning" (e.g., the cloth represents the idea of America).
Part (b) of the definition is partly reflected in the idea of the "cultural flow"
of meaning.24 There is a flow of meaning when people impute meaning upon
external things or upon externalization.25 This is one way in which people
create meanings. The direction of the flow of meaning is from the idea to the
thing. On the other hand, meanings- can create people by interpreting and
reinterpreting the meanings of external things. This process of interpretation
and reinterpretation is also part of the cultural flow of meaning," but this
time the flow is from the meaning of the external thing to the meaning of the
idea. For example, the burning of the American flag leads to an interpretation
and reinterpretation of the meaning of the idea of "liberty" in America. Of
course, part (b) should not be read to imply that there is equality in the
cultural flow of meaning across all segments of the population.27
anthropology. First, the cultural evolutionism approach, originated by Edward B. Tylor in 1871, holds
that all cultures proceed from a primitive state to a more civilized state. See JOHN FRIEDL, THE HUMAN
PORTRAIT 44-45 (1981). Cultural evolutionism has seen a recent revival in the work of Leslie A. White,
who has devised less culturally-biased means of assessing the evolution of a culture, giving rise to the
cultural ecological approach. Id. at 53-55. Second, configurationism, associated with Alfred L. Kroeber,
holds that culture is "superorganic" (more than the sum of the individuals) and that it constrains the
choices made by individuals in the culture. Id. at 48. Third, the culture and personality approach,
associated with Margaret Mead, provides that because there are patterns of cultures, and because
individuals in any given cultural pattern share similar childhood experiences, adults will consequently
"share patterns of behaviors and personality." Id. at 51. Fourth, the finctionalist approach, associated
with Bronislaw Malinowski, stresses the importance of social institutions within a culture (e.g., basic
needs (reproduction) are met through basic institutions (marriage)). Finally, structuralism, associated with
Claude Levi-Strauss, argues "that elements of all cultures are the product of a single mental process
common to all humanity." Id. at 55. For a solid overview of the various theoretical postures imposed
upon cultural anthropology, see generally CULTURE AND SOCIETY: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra.
Regardless of the theoretical posture adopted, the method of cultural anthropology is unambiguously
empirical or positivistic. The most popular positivistic posture is that of phenomenology. See infra note
134 and accompanying text.
There are approaches to the study of culture outside of cultural anthropology. These approaches can
be seen as representing the views of acknowledged philosophers, see, e.g., Alexander, supra, at 21-22
(Marxist), acknowledged sociologists, see, e.g., id. at 15-17 (Weber), or critical theorists. See, e.g.,
ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL., CULTURAL ANALYSIS 133, 137-40 (1984) (noting that Michel Foucault's
analysis, characterized as "neo-structuralist," reflects the influence of Lvi-Strauss); cf. Alexander, supra,
at 23 (classifying Foucault's work as "post-structuralist").
19. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4-7.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3-10.
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Hopefully, the reader understands that cultures differ from one another not
only because different cultures contain different internal/external things, but
because different meanings are attached to internal/external things which are
the same across cultures. This latter idea will be discussed further in subparts
B and C, below. For purposes of this Article, however, the other aspects of
culture suggested by the definition above (e.g., the nature of internal and
external things, cultural flow, and the "social distribution"2 of meaning),
although important, will not be discussed in greater detail. Still other aspects
of culture-its transmittal to the next generation,29 its transmittal to other
cultures,3" its change over time,3' and its relativity32-- not explicitly sug-
gested by the definition above, also will not be discussed here.
28. See generally id. There is a debate among anthropologists as to the primary locus of culture
(i.e., whether it arises from nature or nurturing). For a good background discussion of the debate, see
id. at 269 n.2. One author has persuasively suggested that culture is so useful and appropriate to the
situation that it must have arisen externally. RICHARD A. BARRETT, CULTURE & CONDucT 76-98 (1984).
29. See FR-EDL, supra note 18, at 90-93 (noting that the process of learning to be a member of a
society, usually undergone by children learning the appropriate rules of interaction, is known as
socialization).
30. See id. at 308-17 (noting that acculturation is the adaptive change which occurs when groups
with different cultures come into continuous firsthand contact-it contrasts with revitalization
movements, which respond to such contact by seeking to reestablish old cultural patterns and traditions).
31. As discussed above, the cultural evolutionism approach holds that cultures go through several
stages. See supra note 18. The process of evolution may occur through innovation or diffusion.
Innovation is the recombination of existing elements to create something entirely different, while
diffusion is the borrowing of a cultural item. Although innovation is very important, diffusion tends to
account for most new elements in a society. FRIEDL, supra note 18, at 307. The result of these processes
will be greater differentiation and specialization of social institutions (i.e., an application of the
functionalist approach to culture). See Jeffrey C. Alexander & Paul Colomy, Preface to DIFFERENTIA-
TION THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE at xiii (Jeffrey C. Alexander & Paul Colomy eds., 1990).
32. Professor Friedl expresses relevant points with an eloquence and clarity which merit quoting:
Ethnocentrism is the belief that one's own patterns of behavior are the best: the most natural,
beautiful, right or important. Therefore, other people, to the extent that they live differently, live
by standards that are inhuman, irrational, unnatural or wrong.
... Ethnocentrism is not something we can will away-it constantly creeps back....
In his opposition to the ethnocentrism of nineteenth-century anthropology, [Franz] Boas arrived
at a position that is best described as cultural relativism. By this he meant that the anthropologist
must remain neutral when describing and comparing other cultures, and make no judgments about
the merits of one culture over another....
Cultural relativism was a logical outcome of Boas' work, in which he showed that the history
of each group was distinct. Thus, whatever a culture is like today, it became that way as a result
of its own development, and therefore cannot be ranked against another culture with a different
history. Each culture has changed over time, some more than others in certain areas, and some in
response to pressures that others did not face. The point for Boas was that, because each culture
has its own history, cultures cannot be compared on a scale of excellence in which the ranks are
set according to the standards of one particular group. There could not be a model toward which
all change had been directed in the past, for change had proceeded in many different directions
at the same time.
Every culture proposes solutions to the problems people face. . . . If a solution seems
impractical to us because we know a different solution, we must not overlook the fact that within
its cultural context it may be very practical indeed.
FRIEDL, supra note 18, at 98-105.
For more information on the work of Franz Boas, see generally Arnold Krupat, Irony in
Anthropology: The Work of Franz Boas, in MODERNIST ANTHROPOLOGY 133 (Marc Manganaro ed.,
1990).
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B. The Nature of Subcultures
1. Definition of Subculture
A subculture can be said to involve "a baseline symmetry of perspectives
among participants, cumulatively stabilized and amplified by the back-and-
forth flow of meaning among them."33 That is, the sameness of perspectives
generates a sameness of the meaning of internal (e.g., ideas) and external
things between and among members of the subculture. Clearly, this sameness
or "clusters of meaning,"34 these "shared understandings, 35 rely significantly
on the idea of "perspectives."
Accordingly, perspective is "the device which organizes the attention and
interpretation which an individual gives to externally carried meaning, as well
as his production of such meaning, whether deliberate or spontaneous. 36
Similar perspectives in turn are held by individuals who possess similar "role
repertoires. ' ' 37 Any given individual's role repertoire reflects the various
roles played by individuals in a complex society. These roles relate to the
"division of labor," 38 "household activities and kinship," 39 and personal
characteristics-"[g]ender, age, or ethnicity. '40 In sum, subcultures are in
essence shared meanings that depend on similar perspectives which in turn
depend on similar role repertoires. This compound definition necessitates the
following four observations.
The first is that although it is true that cultures are groups sharing common
meanings,4' to the extent that those meanings depend on the various
perspectives within the culture, it is more accurate to say that a culture
represents a "network of perspectives. '"42 Diversity within a culture,
therefore, springs from the "perspectivation of meaning" 43 within that
culture. Use of the word "network" is critical here. A culture is not simply a
collection of subcultures-it is a "complex interlinkage" of subcultures.
44
The existence of a "dominant subculture," as defined below, 4 is critical to
the existence of this interlinkage of subcultures.
The second observation is that the unit of analysis of the subculture is not
the individual, but the relationship among individuals. This is reflected in the
33. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 70-71.
34. Id. at 74.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 65.
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Indeed, extensive attention has been given to the concept that culture can be a significant
factor in the molding of individual personality. See, e.g., VICTOR BARNOUW, CULTURE AND
PERSONALITY (1979).
41. See supra part I.A.
42. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 68.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
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idea of roles discussed above." Because individuals have various roles, or
are involved in various social relationships, it follows that a given individual
need not be captive to one subculture. Indeed, "[p]eople can be involved with
one subculture, rather, through one role, or a constellation of some of their
roles, and with other subcultures through other roles in their repertoires."4 7
The third observation is that at least three conditions must be met for the
ideal development and continued existence of subcultures. First, "[p]eople
should ... be in similar circumstances, in order to generate similar perspec-
tives. ' ' 48 Second, "[t]hey should ... be in effective interaction,' 49 and third,
they should be "isolated from others."' These last two conditions ensure that
the flow of meaning among the members of the subculture will be a large
percentage of the total cultural flow of meaning that reaches them.I
Fourth, subcultures can be defined according to distinctive meanings.
However, subcultures can also be defined according to distinctive forms of
externalization (e.g., academic communities). 2
2. Dimensions of Variation Among Subcultures
Having defined subcultures, it may be instructive to consider now the
dimensions along which subcultures can vary. Although there are doubtless
a number of such dimensions, I have culled four: (a) size, (b) strength,
(c) degree of nesting, and (d) degree of dominance. Each dimension of a
subculture will be discussed in turn below.
Size is one dimension along which subcultures can vary. Cultures 'nd
subcultures can have "[a]s few as two, or as many as millions"53 of
members. Subcultures are carried in social relationships which can exist
between two or among millions of people. Intermediate between the
subculture with two people and that with millions of people stands the
"microculture. '5 4 The microculture contains "shared meanings directly tied
to specific, likewise shared, experiences of people, settings, and events."55
Microcultures seldom number beyond "a few dozen people, or a hundred."56
Strength is another dimension along which subcultures can vary. It can be
understood if one notes that, although a subculture must be carried on a social
relationship, not all social relationships carry subcultures. For example, a
46. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
47. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 72. Some anthropologists have gone so far as to assert that
individuals who do not partake of a variety of cultures are abnormal. Ward H. Goodenough,
Multiculturalism as the Normal Human Experience, in APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN AMERICA 89-96
(Elizabeth M. Eddy & Williain L. Partridge eds., 1987).
48. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 72.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 98-99.
53. Id. at 68; see also id. at 77.
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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fleeting encounter with a stranger is a social relationship with little, if any,
shared understanding." Since social relationships do not always carry or
reflect subcultures, it follows that the strength of a subculture is measured by
the number of individual social relationships that happen to reflect the
subculture. Stated differently, the strength of a subculture varies in direct
proportion to the number of roles and the degree of importance of roles (from
an individual's role repertoire) that a subculture draws upon and integrates."
The third dimension of vari'ation among subcultures is the extent to which
there are other subcultures (e.g., sub-subcultures59 ) nested or embedded
within them. For example, "[a]n ethnic subculture may splinter on the basis
of class, and then again on the basis of age and gender. ' 60 The more
embedded a sub-subculture is, the more contextualized the meaning shared by
the members of that sub-subculture will become. The end result is that all the
members of the subculture might agree on "decontextualized understandings,
of an 'in principle' variety," (e.g., racism). 6' The members of the sub-
subculture, however, might have a shared understanding not available to the
rest of the subculture (e.g., racism against women).
The fourth dimension along which subcultures may vary is their degree of
dominance or "mainstream-ness." "' [M]ainstream culture' can be seen as a
subculture in command of a more widely reaching cultural apparatus."62 The
cultural apparatus is "'all the organizations and milieus in which artistic,
intellectual; and scientific work goes on, and of the means by which such
work is made available to circles, publics, and masses."'' 63 In America, the
white male sub-subculture is the culture that controls the cultural apparatus.
Note three points about the cultural apparatus. First, the flow of meanings
emanating from the cultural apparatus is not always automatically channeled
into other subcultures. 64 Second, even when the flow of meaning is chan-
neled into other subcultures, there may be an adaptation of the meanings
intended by the dominant subculture. For some subcultures, there will be less
adaption. "Their internal shared perspectives get additional support. '65 For
other subcultures there will be more adaption, because the "messages [from
the cultural apparatus] are affronts, or at least reminders that the bearers of
the subculture are not members of that community on whose baseline
assumptions these messages build. 66 Part of the adaption by the affronted
subculture may involve the development of its own cultural apparatus (e.g.,
57. Id. at 74.
58. Id. at 72-73; see also JOHN M. YINGER, COUNTERCULTURES (1982) (stating that countercultures
are subcultures which interpret meanings in a manner antithetical to the dorihant culture). For an
interesting look at the changing nature of roles in modem society, see JERALD HAGE & CHARLES H.
POWERS, POST-INDUSTRIAL LivEs (1992).
59. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 75.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 92.
63. Id. at 82 (quoting C. Wright Mills).
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id.
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Black Entertainment Television). The third point is that because of the
absence of feedback, the messages from the cultural apparatus may persist
with their "own burden of inefficiency.
67
3. Relations Among Subcultures
As previously discussed, any given individual can embody several sub-
cultures. 68 The arrangement of these subcultures within any given individual
can also vary. For example, the subcultures can "crisscross . . . [or] arrange
themselves like Chinese boxes,' 69 raising the question: Which subculture
predominates within the individual at any given moment? It seems reasonable
to assume that the strongest will predominate. As the reader will recall, the
more a subculture spans an individual's role repertoire, the stronger the
subculture." Yet even when one subculture predominates, subcultures clearly
will have poorly defined boundaries, overlap, and remain uncompartmen-
talized within the individual.7"
The relations of subcultures residing within the individual can be contrasted
to the relations of subcultures carried by social relationships. Individuals exert
no special effort to segregate and compartmentalize the subcultures within
them. In this context, the fuzzy boundaries of subcultures present no special
dilemma. Precisely the opposite is true, however, of subcultures carried by
social relationships. Indistinct subcultural boundaries are an anathema to the
integrity of any given subculture. True, the response of any given subculture
to subcultural difference will vary-show "indifference, or exaggerate it, or
play it down."7 2 In any event, this response will represent "a way of
sharpening reflexively the contours of one's own [subculture]. 73
C. The Culture of Deindividualization
I wish to close this introductory discussion of culture by positing the
existence of something that can be called a "culture of deindividualization."
This culture, in its most decontextualized form, attributes psychological
characteristics to someone on the basis of his or her immutable and apparent
67. Id. at 93.
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 78.
70. See supra text accompanying note 58.
71. HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 73.
72. Id. at 78.
73. Id. at 79.
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physical characteristics. 74 It "deindividualizes" by removing the element of
choice in defining one's own individuality.
To characterize deindividualization as a culture is to argue that deindivi-
dualization reflects all of the aspects of a culture. For example, culture is
transmitted from generation to generation, it is collective, etc." In contrast,
stereotyping76 is an activity that occurs (nonexclusively) within this culture.
Individuals can be stereotyped according to their voluntary membership in a
group-for example, religion. In this case, the individual has chosen to define
his or her individuality by membership in the group, and so deindividuali-
zation is less of an issue.7
In each of the following four points regarding the culture of deindividuali-
zation, "deindividualization" will refer to the attribution of psychological
characteristics on the basis of immutable and apparent physical characteristics.
1. Beneficial vs. Detrimental Deindividualization
Most of the members of Western society, much like the "culture of poverty"
which spans the personal characteristics of its members, are members of the
culture of deindividualization. 78 At the level of subcultural contextualization,
74. As far as I know, identification and definition of this culture is a unique contribution of this
Article. Of course, social scientists have discussed "[the distinction between class and birth-ascribed
stratification." See Gerald D. Berreman, Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions in Social
Stratification, in ANTHROPOLOGY FOR THE NINETIES-INTRODUCTORY READINGS 486 (Johnnetta B. Cole
ed., 1988). My characterization of the problem as one of a culture of deindividualization suggests a
reason why the distinction is invidious and why it is transmitted from generation to generation, taught
to other cultures, etc.
75. For a discussion of the transmittal of a culture, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
76. "A stereotype is an image in which a single set of characteristics, favorable or unfavorable, is
attributed to an entire group." BETH B. HESS ET AL., SOCIOLOGY 231 (2d ed. 1985).
77. There are two underlying issues in this statement. First, it appears that I have painted a black
and white picture of a subject which has some gray areas. Indeed, the cultural malleability of the human
organism seems to be a foundational and unquestioned assumption in cultural anthropology. See, e.g.,
HAVILAND, supra note 6, at 17 (stating that culture is learned or chosen at an early age). Within
psychology, this is known as the strictly behaviorist position. See GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF &
SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934); JOHN B.
WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORIST (1929). Sociobiology has risen up
as a field that challenges the behaviorist project by showing how at least some of our social behaviors
are biologically determined. See generally ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE
PREEMPTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1980). On a more practical and common level, one could debate the
question of how much "effective choice" some individuals have (e.g., homosexuals, members ofstrongly
fundamentalist sects or religions).
Second, when I use the term "immutable" physical characteristics, I am clearly assuming a
characteristic that can be changed only at high economic and psychic cost. Although I am open to a
consideration of all views on these two issues, I avoid a substantial discussion of them because the
model suffers no loss of generality as a result of this avoidance.
78. A succinct statement of the culture of poverty is that "[s]hared poverty generates cultures of
poverty.... People in a poor neighborhood.., have a web of contextualized understandings among
themselves, of the 'I know that you know that I know' type, with which outsiders would mostly be
unfamiliar." HANNERZ, supra note 18, at 76. Hannerz also explains that an outsider to the culture would
have difficulty understanding the rationale behind using certain criteria, such as economic status or
physical attributes, to differentiate classes of people. Id. For a fuller discussion of the culture of poverty,
see generally RICHARD BASHAM, THE CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES 165-69 (1978);
EDWIN EAMES & JUDITH G. GOODE, ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE CITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO URBAN
ANTHROPOLOGY 304-23 (1977); Edwin Eames & Judith G. Goode, The Culture of Poverty: A
Misapplication of Anthropology to Contemporary Issues, in URBAN LIFE: READINGS IN URBAN
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one can distinguish at least two kinds of deindividualization corresponding to
two kinds of subcultures: beneficial and detrimental deindividualization, each
defined by the net effect7 9 of the deindividualization upon the individual."0
In order to further clarify the nature of these two subcultures, I will use as
examples the sub-subcultures of race and gender, each of which is present in
the other subculture, as illustrated in Figure 1. Three observations follow.
DetrientalBeneficial
DeidivduaizaionDeindividualization
subcuturessubcultures
Rae eRace Sex
Figure 1
ANTHROPOLOGY 320 (George Gmelch & Walter P. Zenner eds., 1988); Oscar Lewis, The Culture of
Poverty, in URBAN LIFE: READINGS IN URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY, supra, at 310.
79. This is a critical distinction. It seems simplistic to suggest that whiteness or maleness is a
deindividualization that is consistently beneficial. The negative deindividualization associated with these
qualities (e.g., all whites are racist or all males are sexist) is outweighed, however, by the positive
deindividualization associated with these qualities. The converse observation applies to blackness and
femaleness which are qualities that are net negative deindividualizations.
80. The point is that in a world in which deindividualization exists, the right to not be
prejudged--to be a blank slate-should be valued and cherished. Many whites, males in particular, take
this right for granted, assuming it is their due; this assumption is particularly evident in their interactions
with each other. However, imagine going through life knowing that others are burdened with
preconceptions about your identity, beliefs, capabilities, and so forth. In a world of endemic racism,
many blacks have internalized this hatred towards blackness. See David Rosenfield & Walter G.
Stephan, Intergroup Relations Among Children, in DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 271-97
(Sharon S. Brehm et al. eds., 1981) (noting that studies show that black children exposed to racism
exhibit a preference for a Caucasian doll over a black doll). The right to appear as an individual who
is not prejudged is something more likely to be attributed to whiteness or maleness.
Another common beneficial deindividualization is the presumption, absent overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, that an individual is free of negative qualities. This leads to the dismissal of less-than-
overwhelming evidence with the common refrain "he seems like such a nice boy." Interpretation: he is
a white male like my son or grandson or nephew, and they do not do those things, so the evidence must
be false.
It would appear that the most popular beneficial deindividualization is the attribution of positive
characteristics (e.g., authority, intelligence, articulateness, etc.) to the individual.
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First, because deindividualization relies on immutable and apparent physical
characteristics, membership within any given cultural group (culture,
subculture, sub-subculture) is involuntary or beyond the individual's control.
The implication of this is apparent if one consults the psychological "locus of
control" literature, which demonstrates that individuals attribute positive
results to themselves personally and negative results to factors which are
beyond their control.8' Accordingly, members of the beneficially deindivi-
dualized culture (e.g., whites, males) will have the perspective that none or
very few of their positive life results come from their group membership.
Likewise, members of the detrimentally deindividualized culture (e.g.,
nonwhites, females) will have the perspective that most, if not all, of their
negative life results are attributable to their group membership.
Second, a critical defining element of a subculture is the degree to which
group members' perspectives on meaning are similar (e.g., "we have the same
perspective on what this means"). Perspectives and understandings can differ
depending on the degree of contextualization of meaning. Accordingly, the
fact that individuals are members in the same race sub-subculture or gender
sub-subculture provides no guarantee that they will have the same perspective
on the meaning of detrimental deindividualization. Indeed, they may not even
conceive of themselves as being members of the same subculture. One would
therefore expect to find black men who are sexist, 82 and white women who
are racist.
Similarly, one would expect to find women who are sexist toward men and
other women; and blacks who are racist toward whites and other blacks. 4
81. J. RICHARD EISER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 198-201 (1986); see also Carol S. Dweck & Therese
E. Goetz, Attributions and Learned Helplessness, in 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH
157, 172-75 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1978); John H. Harvey, Attribution of Freedom, in I NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 73, 83-84 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1976).
82. See, e.g., Diane K. Lewis, A Response to Inequality: Black Women, Racism and Sexism, in
BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 43 n.6 (Micheline R. Malson et al. eds.,
1990) ("The black man grapples to achieve social justice and parity with the white male-essentially
to attain white male power, privilege and status-while shoving black women to the back of the bus.").
See generally ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, Black Male Perspectives on the 19th Century Black Woman,
in THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMAN: STRUGGLES AND IMAGES 28 (1978).
83. See KATHLEEN M. BLEE, WOMEN OF THE KLAN: RACISM AND GENDER IN THE 1920s (1991).
84. The paradox of deindividualization that arises where one is using sexism to fight sexism or
racism to fight racism is discussed below. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text The paradox
arises from the perceived necessity for the sexism or racism. In contrast, the reference here is to the kind
of sexism and racism that is not directed toward any particular purpose.
The literature on sex and race discrimination uses the term "essentialism" to characterize the situation
when women or racial minorities make assumptions about the commonality of the other gender or other
races. As demonstrated by the citations following, there have been a number of remarkable analyses of
the problem of essentialism. The point is that a culture of deindividualization allows us to see that we
are dealing with a difference of degree of sexism or racism, not a difference in kind. For example, using
a different word, "essentialism," suggests that one crosses a line into a different kind of sexism or
racism. In reality, most, but not all, of the sexism or racism practiced by males and whites is more
pernicious than that practiced by women and racial minorities.
For a discussion of racial essentialism, see Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1864 (1990); Claudette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Voice, Perspective, Truth and Justice: Race and the
Mountain in the Legal Academy, 38 Loy. L. REV. 61 (1992). For discussions of gender essentialism,
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This is because the decontextualized principle of detrimental deindividuali-
zation takes on a different meaning for one who is a member of a sub-
subculture as opposed to simply a member of the culture of deindividuali-
zation (e.g., "when he does it, it is sexism, when I do the same thing, it isn't
sexism")." One would expect to find an altogether unique perspective among
individuals who represent an overlap of two sub-subcultures (e.g., black
women).,6
Third, there are two reasons why the detrimental deindividualization
subculture is stronger than the beneficial deindividualization subculture. 7
First, assuming two otherwise similar individuals, one might expect more bad
things to happen more often to the detrimentally deindividualized individual,
because that is what it means to be detrimentally deindividualized. Those bad
things would span more of the roles in that individual's repertoire, thereby
causing the detrimental deindividualization subculture to be stronger. Second,
the perception that detrimental deindividualization causes bad things"8 might
lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing even more bad things to happen in
an individual's life.8 9
see Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood and the DifferencelDeviance Divide, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV.
877 (1992); Robin D. Barnes, Black Women Law Professors and Critical Self-Consciousness, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.. 57 (1990-1991); Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy
of Doubt: Treatment of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367 (1992).
85. See the discussion supra at text accompanying note 61 for the argument that principles that are
differently contextualized will have different meanings.
86. Crenshaw's "intersectionality theory" argues that race and sex discrimination, when experienced
simultaneously, amount to more than the sum of the two individual experiences. This seems to be in
accord with the theory presented here. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection ofRace
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139.
87. For the definition of the strength of a subculture, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
88. This is the "locus of control phenomenon," as discussed supra at text accompanying note 81.
89. One example of stereotypes creating self-fulfilling prophecies is illustrated in the Allport and
Postman experiment, conducted in the 1940's. GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR I 11 (1947) (relating the experiment and describing it as an example of the
impact of cultural expectations on perception). Their experiment involved showing a sketch of a subway
train in which a black man and a white man are standing together talking. The black man is dressed in
business clothes; the white man is wearing a T-shirt and carrying a straight razor. The first subject in
each of over forty groups of subjects was asked to examine the picture briefly and describe it to a
second subject, who described it to a third, as in the children's game "telephone." After description
through a chain of six or seven subjects, the drawing was more often than not described as one in which
a black man was holding a razor. Often, he was using it to threaten the white man. Id.; see also
ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEwITNESS TESTIMONY 38-39 (1979) ("In over half of the experiments ... the
[black] man ... is said to hold the razor ... [sometimes] reported as brandishing it ... or as
threatening the white man with it."). See generally Carl 0. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 109, 112-15
(1974). On the role of the expectations of others in self-fulfilling prophecies, see LEE Ross & RICHARD
E. NisBErr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 154-58, 227-28
(1991); Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality, in 18 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 247 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1984).
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2. Original Deindividualization & the Role
of the Cultural Apparatus
I theorize that at the original moment of arbitrarily defining which
immutable and apparent physical characteristics are due beneficial deindivi-
dualization, control of the cultural apparatus" is contested. The defining
moment makes it possible for an arbitrarily defined-group to arbitrarily define
its groupness. Delineation of the boundaries of the newly defined subculture
makes it possible for this new subculture to seize control of the cultural
apparatus. With this control of the flow of meaning, it becomes possible to
reinforce groupness and the meaning of the immutable and apparent physical
characteristics shared by the members of the group (i.e., these are the
characteristics that are due beneficial deindividualization).
The history of race in the Western World9 provides a good illustration of
this theory.92 In a pre-race world, individuals were divided according to their
cultural affiliation. Indeed, as late as 1735, Linnaeus proposed that there were
four categories of human beings: "American, European, Asiatic and Afri-
can."93 For example, in this pre-race world, "white" and "black" Egyptians
were simply Egyptians.94 In this scenario, making arbitrary distinctions
90. For a definition of the cultural apparatus, see supra text accompanying note 63.
91. For useful histories of the idea of race, see THE CONCEPT OF RACE (Ashley Montagu ed., 1964);
MICHAEL BANTON & JONATHAN HARWOOD, THE RACE CONCEPT (1975); ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE IDEA
OF RACE (1965) [hereinafter MONTAGU, IDEA OF RACE]; NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA OF RACE IN
SCIENCE (1982).
92. Although Banton and Harwood do not rely on the idea of control of the cultural apparatus
through race, the point is present throughout their work. See, e.g., BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note
91, at 8 ("[Rlace was a kind of classification invented by Europeans first to press the political claims
of groups within European countries; then to represent the relations between these countries; only later
when the potentialities of this way of labelling people had been extended and biological theories
integrated with social ones, was it imposed upon the rest of the world.").
93. MICHAEL D. OLIEN, THE HUMAN MYTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY 106 (1978).
See generally TORE FRANGSMYR ET AL., LINNAEUS, THE MAN AND HIS WORK (1983); FROM LINNAEUS
TO DARWIN: COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY OF BIOLOGY AND GEOLOGY: PAPERS FROM THE 5TH
EASTER MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR NATURAL HISTORY (Alwyne C. Wheeler & J.H. Price eds.,
1983); DEREK GJERTSEN, THE CLASSICS OF SCIENCE: A STUDY OF TWELVE ENDURING SCIENTIFIC
WORKS (1984).
94. Cf BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 14. Banton and Harwood do not use this specific
example. My point here is that through our race eyes, we might classify some Egyptians as white
Egyptians and some as black Egyptians. In a pre-race world, such a distinction would not have been
plausible because although external physical differences were observed, they were merely geographic
indicators, not indications of innate characteristics. For example, Banton and Harwood observe: "Though
classical antiquity knew no prejudice of the kind seen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
seeds were already there when Europeans first came into contact with Africans." Id. at 24. Despite the
presence of these seeds (e.g., the Christian symbolic equation of white with purity and black with evil)
there is evidence that the "races" interacted without racism in, for example, 16th-century intermarriage
in Europe. Id. at 23. The real separations in a pre-race world were along religious lines. Id. at 7. This
does not present as great a deindividualization problem, however, since one can claim to be a member
of any religion, but not of any race.
For a useful discussion of the history of race and its relevance to the law, see D. Marvin Jones,
Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437 (1993). In contrast to
the anthropological approach taken in this Article, Jones takes a semiotic approach to the issue of race,
demonstrating how the various narratives of race constrain those of us within the law. See id.
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between these two groups of Egyptians on the basis of the pigment of their
skin would have seemed ludicrous.95
The origin of the word "race" is unclear.9 6 In 1775, however, Johann F.
Blumenbach proposed the first scientific taxonomy of human beings that
relied on pigment of skin ("white, yellow, black, red, and brown") as the
primary basis for distinguishing among human beings.97 Of course, the
beneficial deindividualization was concomitant to this taxonomy since it
allowed Blumenbach's fellow Germans to define themselves as the "master
race."98 It may not be too farfetched to view this century's two world wars
as efforts by this arbitrarily defined group of humans, blinded by the folly of
their rhetoric, to seize the worldwide cultural apparatus and thereby control
the worldwide flow of meaning.99 Furthermore, Blumenbach's theory, and
others similar to it, provided a justification for America's unique brand of
slavery.'00
Blumenbach deserves special blame for perverting, perhaps unwittingly, the
methods of science to serve narrow nationalistic aims."'0 "Unfortunately the
95. Although distinctions between people were made at this time, they were seldom based on
immutable and physically appaient racial characteristics. MONTAGU, IDEA OF RACE, supra note 91, at
13.
96. Michael Olien suggests that Georges Louis Leclerc, conte de Buffon, was the first to use "race"
to describe human beings. OLIEN, supra note 93, at 106. Banton and Harwood suggest that the word
first appeared (in English) in 1508 and was used to describe different categories of people in 1684 by
Francois Bernier. BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 13. See generally STEPAN, supra note 91
(discussing the history of the concept of race in science); THE INvENTiON OF ETHNICITY (Werner Sollors
ed., 1989) (compiling various works by various authors concerning ethnicity and culture).
97. OLIEN, supra note 93, at 106-07 (discussing Blumenbach's classification).
98. Banton and Harwood observe:
The most destructive and terrible phase in the career of the race concept came in Hitler's
Germany. An Englishman turned German citizen called Houston Stewart Chamberlain had
published in German in 1897 two volumes entitled The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.
Their theme was that race is made by man, by the will of the people. "Even if it were proved
that in the past there never was an Aryan race, we want there to be one in the future" and the
Germans were to be its genius. The book was publicised by the Kaiser and its themes must
have been known to the young Hitler who came to pay court to the sickly Chamberlain in
1923. In the later exhortations of Hitler, these ideas of the German master race ... were to
attain their most strident expression ....
BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 41-42.
99. For example, Banton and Harwood observe: "The stress on Jews, gypsies, Negroes and others
as inferior races enabled the National Socialists to get other Germans to acquiesce in brutalities against
which they might otherwise have revolted." Id. at 42. I have simply recast this observation in terms of
the culture of deindividualization.
100. The argument that racism came to America on 16th-century slave ships is a revisionist theory
reflecting the extent to which we are all still prisoners of the idea of race. Slaves came on the slave
ships as they had come on slave ships for hundreds of years before that time. And, although the sale
of a human being is something to be deplored, I would argue that what made American slavery unique
was that the coincidental development of the idea of race made it possible to argue that slaves were
slaves not because they had been sold into slavery, but because of something unique about them (and
all those who look like them). Since slavery became linked with the immutable and physically apparent,
it became something that neither one nor one's progeny could ever escape. For a discussion of the
impact of Blumenbach's work on American thinking, see id. at 25.
101. The model followed here suggests that scholarship is a high calling. See, e.g., Audain, supra
note 1, at 1075-76. Under this model, scholars must accept responsibility for their ideas. Although I
consider this value an intertemporal one that is just as valuable today as in 1775, Banton and Harwood
are more forgiving:
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scientific rigor of Blumenbach helped to establish a belief in the validity of
race in the minds of both scholars and the general public."'0 2 With
Blumenbach's work began the unambiguous imprisonment of the human
imagination based on the idea that human beings, like dogs, might be
distinguished on the basis of immutable and apparent physical characteristics.
Some of the leading lights of eighteenth-century thought, including Thomas
Macaulay, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill, almost immediately
attacked the proposition that race determines culture, with Mill calling the
proposition "vulgar."'0 3 Further, Mendel's work in genetics made highly
improbable the argument that the morphological typologies of humans were
fixed (e.g., a single inherited package which included thin lips, pink skin,
etc.). 0 4 In the early part of this century, the work of anthropologists Boas
and Malinowski demonstrated that race bore no relation to the distribution of
cultural patterns °105
The theory that races do not and cannot exist is today on solid scientific
footing.'0 6 "In its simplest terms the difficulty is that each individual and
each population is genetically distinct and as there are no clear-cut biological
indications of which differences are the most important, there are no
biological grounds for deciding which individuals and which populations
should go into the same category. '"' 7 Based on the proposition that
There was no reason in principle for rejecting the proposition that race determined culture. It
could have been true. Scientists are continually making mistakes but unlike Darwin they are
today involved in an intellectual community which usually recognizes them before they reach
a popular audience. Criticism of racial theories failed to destroy them at that time not because
the proponents or racial theories were evil, prejudiced men, but because the scientific
community in the biological field was still very loosely organized and the world outside was
eager to utilize the theories before they had won widespread scientific support.
BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 32-33. Further, it has been argued that the failure of
anthropologists to renounce race as a classification is directly responsible for racism. STANLEY R.
BARRETr, THE REBIRTH OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 222-28 (1984).
102. OLIEN, supra note 93, at 107.
103. BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 43.
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 45.
106. This theory of non-race, however, has yet to carry the day in anthropology. For example, one
compilation classifying 1264 cultures in 563 societies around the world still finds it necessary to use
race as a distinguishing factor. See GEORGE P. MURDOCK, ATLAS OF WORLD CULTURES (1981).
107. BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 55. So where then do races come from? After all,
didn't God create them? I believe this is one of the most powerful questions perpetuating racism. It
protects racism by suggesting that it is divinely ordained, and that we, as mere mortals, should not seek
to undo what has been divinely ordained. The question reflects a mind that is in an intellectual prison
house. Race did not. exist until some scholar told the world it existed. The race prison house is contained
within another prison house: the prison house of teleology. Teleology is the position within philosophy
which says that all things have a purpose. The early Christian Church sanctified the proposition that God
is the Mover who provides purpose for all things.
The history of ideas has demonstrated over the past 1000 years that the teleological assertion is not
factually true. This is not a debate over whether God is, so much as a debate over what God does. Thus,
with respect to inanimate objects, Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton showed that the objects moved as
a result of a physical force, rather than a divine one. With respect to nonhuman life, Darwin taught that
birds don't fly south in the winter because God wants them to; they fly south because they can. Because
those that fail to do so freeze to death, the only birds we see are the progeny of those that had the genes
directing them to fly south for the winter.
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"'yesterday's science is today's common sense and tomorrow's nonsense,'
anthropologist Frank B. Livingstone has argued that on the concept of race,
"'tomorrow is here."""e Arguing along similar lines, anthropologist Ashley
Montagu reminds us that according to seventeenth-century science, "phlogis-
ton" was a substance presumably present in all material, given off by burning.
"'Race,"' says Montagu, perhaps the most vocal of modern non-racists, "'is
the phlogiston of our time.""0 9
I take the argument a step further, making my thesis a radical theory of
non-race. I argue that not only is it impossible to conceive of the possibility
of race, but to assert the very idea of race itself, is racist. This is because
once the possibility of a construct of race arises, the formation of beliefs with
respect to that construct is inevitable. My radical theory is premised on the
social psychology of belief formation."' The deindividualization that
follows on the heels of race is automatic and inevitable. Although it may vary
in its degree of perniciousness, this deindividualization denies individuals the
right to announce, assert, or otherwise practice their individuality.
Although the role of the cultural apparatus in deindividualization is illus-
trated here using the sub-subculture of race, an equally plausible tale could
So where do "races" come from? Absolutely: they come from nowhere in particular, because "they"
don't exist. It is ludicrous to define a "fly-south" race of birds because a completely different trait may
be adaptive to the environment tomorrow. The birds will still be birds, their species definition depending
quite logically on their ability to mate with one another. For example, scientists have shown that
concentration of pigment in the skin increases among human groups as one approaches the equator and
decreases as one moves away from it. Id. at 57. What we see are the progeny, possibly after thousands
of years of reproduction, of those who happened to have the gene for producing pigment, and who
therefore survived life in the sun to reproduce.
True, things do not look good for the teleology story. But that is not to say that Darwin's tale applies
to social change in humans. It is a story about physical change. Social scientists today are in agreement
that Social Darwinism (never the intention of Darwin) is simply an ethnocentric way for one culture to
argue that it is superior to another (e.g., I can tell if you are physically fit, but how would I know if you
are socially fit?). See FRIEDL, supra note 18, at 103.
For discussions of the demise of teleological explanations in the sciences, see ALEXANDER
ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 52-57, 135-38 (1988). For a discussion of evolution of
races, see ROBIN Fox, ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY 49-82 (1973); ROBERT L. LEHRMAN, RACE,
EVOLUTION AND MANKIND (1966). For a discussion of Social Darwinism, see generally PIT DE RooY
ET AL., IMPERIAL MONKEY BUSINESS: RACIAL SUPREMACY IN SOCIAL DARWINIST THEORY AND
COLONIAL PRACTICE (Jan Breman ed., 1990), and CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE:
THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1991).
108. BANTON & HARWOOD, supra note 91, at 58-59 (quoting Livingstone).
109. Id. at 59 (quoting Montagu); see also ASHLEY MONTAGU, RACE, SCIENCE AND HUMANITY at
iii (1963) (noting that, until relatively recently, many things which we now know to be false myths were
considered scientific fact, such as the idea that tomatoes and potatoes are poisonous, or that the Earth
is flat and the sun revolves around it).
110. See, e.g., MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR 12
(1975) (defining a belief as the link between an object and an attribute). My argument is that as long
as the object (race) is present, there will be attributes to link to it. This is very different from ethnicity
(e.g., cultural grouping on the basis of language, religion, etc.) which is voluntary and generally
becomes known only once it has been announced. Notice, however, that ethnocentricity is defined as
cultural bias, even if the culture is not ethnically defined. See supra note 32. For example, the
ethnocentricity stemming from membership in a race-based culture (e.g., the culture of beneficial
deindividualization), is discussed below. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
Although other scholars have conducted useful analyses of the different ways in which race is used
in the law, none has yet discussed the legal implications of a theory of non-race. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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be told about the moment of deindividualization from a gender standpoint.
That tale, however, should be told by someone more qualified than I.
3. Continued Deindividualization & the Paradox of
Deindividualization
The deindividualization occurring at the original moment of deindividuali-
zation continues beyond that original moment for at least two reasons. First,
of the many progeny of those who were originally beneficially deindivi-
dualized, those having physical characteristics similar to the members of the
original group have little or no incentive to relinquish their beneficial
deindividualization. Focusing on the race sub-subculture for the moment, let
me hasten to add that I do not believe that this is a "black" or "white"
phenomenon, but simply a perceived self-interest phenomenon."' In a
parallel universe in which the group seizing control of the cultural apparatus
denominated itself "black," the world we have today would not necessarily be
different, just reversed in terms of labels.
This perceived self-interest explains miscegenation laws." 2 Having had
the good fortune of being born with immutable and physically apparent traits
that are arbitrarily beneficially deindividualized, one would want nothing less
for one's progeny." 3 Yet, against this story of pure self-interest for the
average, one finds exceptions that celebrate and vindicate the power of human
dignity. Stated in pure race terms, there are whites who challenge racism
against blacks simply because of the immorality, unfairness, and intellectual
dishonesty of it all. These understanding individuals do so even though, by
their challenge, they may be undoing a system which benefits them personally.'
111. This self-interest is only perceived rather than actual, because the diminishing of detrimental
deindividualization is likely to improve life for everyone.
112. Miscegenation laws are, of course, all about perpetuating white supremacy. It is my assumption
that this perpetuation is consistent with the self-interest of those who are white. For a discussion of
miscegenation laws, see generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 18.8, at 402 (1986); Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REv. 1224, 1228 (1966). See generally ROBERT J. SiCKELS,
RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 64-75 (1972); Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's
Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966) (providing an
overview of the history of miscegenation laws); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 149 (1988) (comparing the purpose of
miscegenation laws in fostering white supremacy to the purpose of sodomy laws in fostering traditional
sex roles).
113. Compare this idea with the notion that vigorous interracial breeding should be undertaken to
develop a master human race which is devoid of any racial stratifications or related weaknesses. See
ROBIN Fox, The Abolition of Race, in ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY 67-82 (2d ed. 1991).
114. One example is the group of whites who, risking life and limb, served as conductors in the
Underground Railroad. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847) (holding that notice
of a person's status as a runaway slave need not be in writing to uphold a conviction for harboring
fugitives); see also Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985, 1020 (1990) ("[Religion] provided a framework
for understanding the differences between cruel white overseers and whites who worked on the
underground railroad to freedom."). For an interesting fictional piece on the subject, see MARCIE M.
STADELHOFEN, THE FREEDOM SIDE (1982) (describing a young black slave's escape from slavery guided
by a white man).
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A second reason why deindividualization persists beyond its original point
is because those who have been detrimentally deindividualized use that
experience to define the contours of their subculture. The most culturally
European of individuals who happens to be "black" is accepted into the
African-American subculture. It does not matter that the individual knows
nothing about that subculture other than its significant overlap with the
detrimentally deindividualized subculture. Indeed, this individual may never
have experienced racism. Conversely, someone who happens to be "white" but
has a liking or propensity for African-American culture is less likely to be
accepted into that culture. Identification of an African-American subculture
(beginning with the name, of course) to which anyone can voluntarily belong
is critical to distinguishing the African-American subculture from the
subculture of the detrimentally deindividualized.
Yet, in the minds of most people, the oppression of racism lies at the very
heart of the African-American subculture. This cannot be true, however, since
there are many people who participate in the African-American subculture
(e.g., music, dance, language) who have not been racially oppressed" 5 and
vice versa. More importantly, those who insist on conflating the African-
American subculture with the subculture of detrimental deindividualization
will confront the paradox of deindividualization.
The paradox of deindividualization has many representations. At its core,
however, it is that those who have been detrimentally deindividualized choose
to use their deindividualization to serve a collective purpose. The simple
example in the case of race is the individual who must use racism to fight
racism. This racism is obvious when blacks seek to exclude whites from
social organizations. It is more subtle when blacks use blackness as a basis
for social organization. To use race to fight racism is to validate the
proposition that psychological traits can be successfully associated with this
mythical and arbitrary construct of race, and in particular, the black race. To
assume that African-American culture is inextricably intertwined with the
blackness of one's skin is admittedly not detrimental deindividualization, but
it is still deindividualization. Consistent with the radical theory of non-race
advanced above, it is still racism, albeit not as pernicious as other forms. By
perpetuating an idea of race, and in particular the black race, we are unwitting
accomplices in perpetuating the existence of the very evil we seek to destroy.
This is the paradox of blackness, one particular racial version of the paradox
of deindividualization."
6
115, There is a transmission mechanism between the race sub-subculture and the African-American
subculture. For example, a strong impetus for the Negro spiritual, or for that matter modem-day rap
music, is the racial oppression of black people. Once the artifact has been transmitted into the African-
American subculture, however, it is available to all, even those who have never experienced racial
oppression. Cf. Niara Sudarkasa, African andAfro-American Family Structure, in ANTHROPOLOGY FOR
THE NINETIEs 182-210 (Johnnetta B. Cole ed., 1988).
116. Once again, let me stress that I use the example of blackness because of my familiarity with
it. One could advance similar arguments with respect to other "races."
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Although little has been written on the paradox of blackness, a good deal
has been written on the gender version of the paradox of deindividualization.
An example is the "equality" versus "difference" debate in feminist thought.
Simply stated, the issue is whether "women want to be equal to men (with the
meaning of 'equal' hotly contested), or [whether] women see biology as
establishing a difference that will always require a strong recognition and that
might ultimately define quite separate possibilities inside 'the human[.]' ' 1 7
Each side of the debate responds to the paradox of deindividualization in a
different manner. The "difference" side of the debate, at some level, concedes
the deindividualization of women by claiming that there are psychological
traits associated with the status of womanhood. For example, that a woman
will be assumed to possess the psychological traits associated with mother-
hood, even if she has no desire, intention, or capacity to become a mother.
"Difference" proponents are willing to accept this deindividualization so that
women can organize to fend off detrimental deindividualization.
On the other hand, the "equality" side of the debate rejects the deindivi-
dualization of women altogether, asserting that women are individuals just like
men. Each woman should be taken on her own terms according to whatever
psychological traits she brings to the table. For this side of the debate, the
paradox of deindividualization never presents itself because there is no
justifiable reason for which women can be deindividualized.
It is important to note that scholars of feminist thought recognize that there
have been many prior incarnations or "past taxonomies" to this debate."'
Indeed, one author has gone so far as to call this debate or tension "this
paradox we live with."" 9 My objective in discussing the paradox in feminist
thought is to demonstrate that it is a manifestation of a broader paradox of
deindividualization: One that confronts all who have been deindividualized,
especially those who have been detrimentally deindividualized.
With respect to the paradox of deindividualization, one might argue, "So
what? After all, racism and sexism are wars, and a fundamental axiom of
warfare is that one should fight fire with fire." True, in a war of physical
annihilation, it is better to annihilate than to be annihilated. But in a war over
the morality, fairness, or justice of the opponent's posture, adoption of the
opponent's posture with gusto is not a strategy that is likely to lead to victory.
117. Ann Snitow, A Gender Diary, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 9, 24 (Mariane Hirsch & Evelyn F.
Keller eds., 1990).
118. Id. at 14.
119. Id. (emphasis added). For some interesting insights into the nature of the "difference" debate,
see generally Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DuKE L.J. 296.
Some scholars in the law have begun to challenge the category of gender and to consider the
implications of that challenge for the law. This is completely consistent with my argument that the
subculture of gender falls within the culture of deindividualization (e.g., a woman is first a member of
a group called "women"' and second an individual). See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Toward a
Postessentialist Methodology, or a Call to Countercatagorical Practice 12-25 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Indiana Law Journal). Other nonlegal scholars have also recently begun to demonstrate
the manner in which our conception of gender is socially constructed. See, e.g., THOMAS LAQUER,
MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREuD (1990).
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This point lies at the heart of the "unclean hands""12 defense and Ghandi's
theory of nonviolent resistance.12' To clarify this position in the example of
race, a distinction must be made between a strategy for social survival (e.g.,
formation of black organizations because blacks could not be admitted
elsewhere) and strategies for fighting racism. Although it is pragmatic for
some race-based organizations and policies to continue in the face of
persistent racism (something I have personally experienced),' 22 it is
counterproductive to deny the existence of the paradox of blackness that
reliance on a construct of race makes possible. Investigating the ways of
ameliorating that paradox is worthwhile.
2 1
4. A Reason to Hope
Perhaps the most powerful reason to believe that we as a species will
eventually eliminate the problem of deindividualization stems from the fact
that humanity has made significant progress in eliminating the 'culture of
dehumanization. For example, the continued success and impact of the human
rights movement 12 4 suggests that many people the world over have become
socialized to view others as human and not as subhuman, a marked improve-
ment from the time when language often marked the boundary between
"people" and "nonpeople."' 25
Of course, there is much work left to do in the transition to a culture of full
individuality. At the personal level, one possible strategy is to approach others
with a very loose sense of which culture they might embrace. In this context,
our open minds might lead us to seek out the uniqueness of the individuals we
encounter. At the broader, less personal level, I believe that because of the
nature of the deindividualization, those who have been detrimentally
deindividualized should be the focus of us all.
2 6
120. See KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., REMEDIES 208-14 (1992).
121. Cf. Cook, supra note 114, at 1021-44 (analyzing multiple facets of Dr. Martin Luther King's
methodology, including social struggle, experiential deconstruction, and reconstructive theorizing).
122. See infra part III.C. (discussing the law and economics of racial discrimination).
123. This discussion on practical dimensions of the Article is revisited. See infra note 366 and
accompanying text.
124. See WARREN L. HOLLEMAN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: WESTERN VALUES AND
THEOLOGICAL PERPECTIVES (1987). See generally A.M. Stuyt, Human Rights-An Outline, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS SOURCES 165 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1988) (providing an overview of the
sources of human rights).
125. "[I]n many languages, especially those of non-Western societies, the word used to refer to one's
own tribe or ethnic group literally means 'mankind' or 'human.' This implies that members of other
groups are less than human." FRIEDL, supra note 18, at 99. Friedl goes on to cite "Eskimo," as meaning
"eaters of raw flesh." The Alaskan natives, however, referred to themselves as "Inuit," which means
"real people." From their point of view, eating raw flesh is what real people do. Id.; see also Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
126. Since I am a member of the subculture of detrimental deindividualization (i.e., I have
experienced racism), it could be argued that I am being ethnocentric in suggesting that everyone should
be attuned to my cultural point of view. See supra note 32. If I had suggested in this Article that the
only way to view racism is from the point of view of those who have experienced it, then I would be
ethnocentric. Instead, I have suggested unpopular things, such as that the concept of blackness helps to
perpetuate racism. I now make a different pragmatic argument on the best way to end racism. Since,
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The amelioration of detrimental deindividualization can come from two
areas. First and foremost, those who have been beneficially deindividualized,
(e.g., men and whites) should be encouraged to see the perspective of those
who have been detrimentally deindividualized. The technique here is critical
since its net effect may be counterproductive, resulting in deindividualization
by, for example, treating all men or whites alike for purposes of indoctrina-
tion. Part II of this Article is an attempt to publicize one technique that will
not have such counterproductive results. Second, those who have been detri-
mentally deindividualized need to be mindful of the paradox of deindividuali-
zation. One way to accomplish this is to bear in mind the importance and
separateness of traditional cultures (e.g., not all who are black are African or
African-American and not all who are African or African-American are
black). 27 Part III develops this point further.
II. CRITICAL CULTURAL LAW & ECONOMICS - CULTURAL
Critical Cultural Law & Economics-Cultural ("CCL&Ec-C") is the analysis
that results when culture informs law and economics. Subpart A explains in
greater detail why law and economics might benefit from the explicit
consideration of culture. Subpart B explores how this benefit might result
from such a consideration. Subparts C and D present summaries of the law
and economics of discrimination. Finally, Subpart E illustrates a cultural
critique of the law and economics of discrimination.
A. The Phenomenology of Law & Economics
Clearly, intellectual honesty must be one of the chief defining characteris-
tics of an intellectual discipline. It follows, then, that we are only giving in
to intellectual honesty when we choose to make explicit the implicit cultural
bias of law and economic analysis. What remains is to show that law and
economics has, at times, an implicit cultural bias.
This illustration proceeds first with the understanding that the methodology
of law and economics is essentially the methodology of economics.' 2 The
methodology of economics, in turn, is the "scientific method." The scientific
method has as its central component a testable, refutable theory which
in my consideration, the actions of whites are the primary cause of racism, these actions might be
attenuated by having whites look at racism from the standpoint of those who are experiencing its
consequences.
127. One of my favorite examples of this is a white colleague of mine who is South African by birth -
and American by choice. He has more knowledge, experience, and affinity for Africa than I could ever
possibly have. He is therefore more of an African-American than I. I submit that people who resist this
idea are prisoners of the idea of race, who see African-American as a code word for black. As a further
example, African-American is only part of what I culturally choose to be. Another very important part
of me that I choose to identify with is Haitian-American. Once again, if one is prisoner to the idea of
race, whites can be part Irish, part German, etc., but blacks (in America at least) have no such
luxury-they are just black. The identity of the individual is subsumed within the construct of race.
128. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1988).
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explains a phenomenon. Ideally, the theory will yield predictions or
conditional statements about the phenomenon.'29 At a minimum, the method
seems to assume that there is some objective or independent reality or truth
which can be discovered. 3 ' Also, the method embodies a strong commit-
ment to norms of objectivity and reliability.' 3 1
The second step in demonstrating the cultural bias of law and economics
involves understanding the distinction between the "positive" and the
"normative." Economists, and therefore lawyer-economists, use the term
129. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 19-21 (9th ed. 1990)
130. H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 12 (1988). Let me
make three observations about this point. First, although Hegel drove home the proposition that there
is a reality outside of us that can be discovered, that proposition was one of many in a thousand-year-old
debate between the positivists and the nonpositivists (or the relativists and the nonrelativists). The
essential project of the relativists or positivists has been to assert the empirically true proposition that
"[o]f all things the measure is man" (a quote attributed to Protagoras, an early Sophist). NORMAN
MELCHERT, THE GREAT CONVERSATION 41 (1991). From this it follows that the task is one of
discovering better methods to assess the empirical reality of which humankind is a part. I would argue
that there have been three major nodes in the history of positivism (or relativism, or empiricism). The
Sophists can be said to be the original positivists. See Jeffrey A. Standen, Note, Critical Legal Studies
as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 VA. L. REV. 983, 985-86; cf. JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN INTERESTS 67-90 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1971) (discussing the development of
positivism); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 235-45, 288-310 (1988) (tracing the history of positivism to its roots in the transition to
the Enlightenment era). Auguste Comte is widely regarded as the father of positivism (i.e., developed
a method of experimentation which involved the separation of fact from value). See BRIAN MORRIS,
WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 233-39 (1991). Finally, the logical positivists extended and
radically refined Comte's method (e.g., all claims should be verifiable and those that are not, such as
metaphysics and ethics, should be rejected). See MELCHERT, supra, at 508-11. The nonpositivist project,
which goes by various names (e.g., idealist, students of hermeneutics, or deconstructionist), reacts
against positivism (e.g., human actions have meanings that must be interpreted). See ROSENBERG, supra
note 107, at 19-20. Philosophers generally agree that in this age-old debate, "[e]urrently, the sophists
seem to be in the ascendancy." MELCHERT, supra, at 580. It is equally clear, however, that positivism
has refined itself over time in response to the criticisms of nonpositivists. See generally Standen, supra,
at 985-91 (discussing the development of positivism in the legal academy).
My second observation is that one of the fundamental arguments between the positivists and the
nonpositivists is an argument about the nature of moral truth. Positivists, it is argued, are more likely
to submit to a consequentialist theory of moral truth (e.g., utilitarianism focuses on the outcome of
action, seeking the greatest good for the greatest number), while antipositivists are more likely to
subscribe to deontological theories of moral truth (e.g., Kant's a priori moral principles derived from
pure reason). See ROSENBERG, supra note 107, at 176-84.
As my third observation, I submit that since the time of the Sophists, science has and will continue
to remove many of our questions from the moral plane because of its commitment to factual truth (e.g.,
believing in a heliocentric theory of our solar system is not a moral question, as the church once
asserted). See generally JOSEPH BEN-DAVID, THE SCIENTIST'S ROLE IN SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 65-66, 70-71 (1971) (describing the development of scientific thought in the 15th and 16th
centuries); ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 242-50 (1973) (describing how Puritanism led to the elimination of religious restrictions
on scientific study). I am, therefore, in favor of a naked positivism that has a commitment to the
discovery of truth. In the meantime, consistent with the positivistic principle of "fallibilism" (i.e.,
knowledge of a given subject is incomplete and may be wrong, see MELCHERT, supra, at 470, 582), it
seems to me eminently positivistic for positivism to continue to be informed by the insights of
nonpositivism. This position is consistent with a realist philosophy of the social sciences. This realism,
in turn, is consistent with a commitment to what works (i.e., Pragmatism). Hegel was confident that our
species would eventually arrive at a state of absolute knowledge. See id. at 406. See generally MORRIS,
supra, at 188-214 (discussing the Hegelian-Marxist tradition). I, on the other hand, remain aguostic
regarding that proposition.131. BERNARD, supra note 130, at 12.
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"positive" to refer to the descriptive: what is or what will be. "Normative"
refers to what should be, which involves a value judgment. 3 2 The scientific
method, therefore, can only describe and explain what is; it offers no
substitute for the value judgment involved in deciding what ought to be.
One need not challenge the premise of this distinction to note that it is
missing something. In particular, we who subscribe to the distinction between
the positive and the normative have given insufficient attention to the use of
the positive to defend the normative. I will refer to this use as the "ideo-
apologetic." It is more accurate to suggest that the scientific method can give
rise to at least three kinds of analyses: the positive, the normative, and the
ideo-apologetic.'3 3
There are several things to note about the ideo-apologetic. First, it can occur
consciously or unconsciously. Second, it is more likely to occur where the
empirical data is scant or ambiguous. Third, it is more likely to occur on
issues where strongly held ideologies diverge greatly. Finally, it is more likely
to occur among those who have training in rhetorical advocacy (e.g.,
philosophers, lawyers).
Of course, when asked why we advocate the ideologies that we do,
especially in the face of scant, ambiguous, or sometimes wholly contradictory
data, most of us would probably respond that it "feels right." It is at this point
that we all subscribe to phenomenology as a theory of knowledge. Phenome-
nology refers to the individual's ability to "sense reality and to describe it in
words, rather than numbers-words that reflect consciousness and perception." '34
132. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 129, at 115. The value-free nature of the social sciences was
something originally championed by the great sociologist Max Weber. He saw the distinction between
the "is" and the "ought" as a way to maximize the effectiveness of the social scientist. ROSENBERG,
supra note 107, at 186-90. Weber, of course, was reflecting the original idea of Comte.
133. Only recently have economists begun to discuss critically the fact that economic analysis can
serve as a rhetorical instrument. I take this discussion a step further and suggest that economics can be
used as a rhetorical instrument in defense of a preexisting ideology. Seminal works on the topic of
economics as rhetoric include: THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming 1995);
Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 481 (1983); Donald N. McCloskey,
The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1988).
134. BERNARD, supra note 130, at 22 (emphasis in original). There are three points to note here.
First, phenomenology as a construct has a history. It originated in 1807 with Hegel in his attempts to
answer the question of whether there is a reality independent of our knowledge of it. MORRIS, supra
note 130, at 188-99. The answer is "yes"; we know this by engaging in the phenomenology (i.e.,
watching the experience) of the phenomenon called the human mind (i.e., its development within a
single individual or in the history of the world). See MELCHERT, supra note 130, at 404-05. It was for
Husserl, however, approximately 100 years later, to make phenomenology a complete method of
(empirical) inquiry:
For Husserl, phenomenology is (a) a science which is (b) purely descriptive, rather than
deductive or explanatory, (c) which sets aside in a systematic way all prior assumptions and
presuppositions, (d) whose subject matter is consciousness-its structure, its contents, and its
"intended" objects-and (e) whose outcome is a description of essences-e.g., an account of
what it is to be an act of perception or the object of a remembering.
MELCHERT, supra note 130, at 538 (emphasis in original). Husserl's work has been modified and
reinterpreted, most notably at the hands of his most famous student, Martin Heidegger. Id. The
phenomenology to which I refer in this Article is essentially Husserl's methodology.
Phenomenological analysis of one kind or another has found a warm reception among legal scholars.
See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1984); Donald H.J. Hermann, Phenomenology, Structuralism,
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The third and final step in showing the cultural bias of law and economics
is to realize that what we sense as social reality is very much a function of
who we are, and that who we are is inextricably intertwined with the cultures
and subcultures to which we belong. It then follows that one's choices of
economic theories and the manner in which one uses them to understand the
law will, at times, reflect one's particular cultural biases. This suggests that
ideo-apologetic analysis is also more likely to be conducted on issues that
have different meanings in different cultures.
It was suggested above that intellectual honesty is one reason to have
phenomenology influence law and economics. Additionally, a law and
economic analysis cognizant of phenomenology will be more intellectually
powerful, and will have greater predictive accuracy and credibility. If law and
economics is to continue to be more than an intellectual, exercise, its
practitioners must continue to value these traits.
In suggesting that law and economic analysis is at times phenomenological,
I set forth in sharp relief the historic debate 135 between the positivists
(economics) and the nonpositivists (phenomenology). There are many points
of disagreement between the positivists and the nonpositivists, not the least
of which is that the positivists advocate the use of the scientific method while
the nonpositivists do not. More importantly, there are many types of
nonpositivists. 36 Therefore, it is possible to imagine almost complete
irreconcilability between positivism and some forms of nonpositivism (e.g.,
Humanism, a form of nonpositivism, holds that humans construct reality,
while positivism holds that there is objective reality to be discovered).' On
the other hand, it is clear that positivism can only be aided by other forms of
nonpositivism (e.g., phenomenology). Since anthropology is arguably the most
phenomenological of the social sciences,'3" I now turn to a consideration of
its method.
Hermeneutics, and Legal Study: Applications of Contemporary Continental Thought to Legal
Phenomena, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 379 (1982); Robert J. Lipkin, Pragmatism-The Unfinished
Revolution: Doctrinaire and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's Social Thought, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1561
(1993).
The second point is that the pursuit of phenomenology is consistent with a project of scientific
realism (i.e., no one really does all the things that good logical positivists are supposed to do, see infra
note 247). After scientific realism, "[t]here are now four ways to go: critical realism, a 'metaphysically
neutral' phenomenalism (or empirical realism), skepticism, or some version of Kantism." MANICAS,
supra note 2, at 248. Phenomenology is consistent with empirical realism.
Third, when the "feels right" approach is applied to questions of ethics or morality, as it often is,
positivists call this the "emotive theory of ethics." See MELCHERT, supra note 130, at 511.
135. See ROSENBERG, supra note 107, at 205; see also supra note 130.
136. See ROSENBERG, supra note 107, at 20.
137. BERNARD, supra note 130, at 21-22.
138. See id. at 22-23.
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B. Cultural Critique & the Methodology of Cultural Anthropology
A cultural critique of the use of law and economics can take at least three
forms, each of which may occur independently of, or concurrently with, one
another. The first form attempts to demonstrate how two analysts with
significantly different perspectives or from different subcultures might see the
law and economics of the issue differently, or how their cultures inform the
law and economic analysis that each conducts. A second form might
demonstrate how the contextualization of the issue would result in a different
kind of law and economic analysis. A third form-which will be discussed in
the remainder of this Subpart'-might argue that the methodology of
cultural anthropology was not followed.
Cultural anthropologists confront two problems when they cross into other
cultures to analyze them. First, they must hold in abeyance any sense of their
own culture. Stated differently, they must hold their cultural bias in
check. 4 ' Second, they must develop an accurate sense for the culture that
they are analyzing. Clearly, one who seeks to apply law and economic
analysis to a partly or completely foreign culture or subculture encounters
similar problems.
There are four analytical methods used by cultural anthropologists:
participant observer, unobtrusive observer, content analysis, and disguised
field observation.4' These methods differ in their capacity to address the
two problems discussed above. They share, however, a unifying theme: one
cannot fully analyze a different culture without somehow getting a sense of
it. Analysis on the basis of first principles alone is antithetical to cultural
analysis as envisioned by the cultural anthropologist. Each of the four
methods will be very briefly discussed below.
The participant observer method involves just that: the anthropologist
participates in the life of the culture while simultaneously observing it.'42
Indeed, "[t]he strength of participant observation is that you as a researcher
become the instrument for both data collection and analysis through your own
experience." 143 The successful participant observer must develop and
139. Part II.E, below, attempts to apply all three forms of the cultural critique of law and economics.
It shows how my membership in the culture of detrimental deindividualization (i.e., I have experienced
racism) leads me to view the economics of discrimination differently than others who presumably have
not experienced racism (e.g., Posner and Epstein). I also attempt to contextualize the deindividualizing
(i.e., racist) incidents that I discuss by providing the reader with a sense of who I am as an individual.
140. One of the more recent movements in cultural anthropology is critical anthropology. One of the
hotly debated questions within critical anthropology is the extent to which it is possible for
anthropologists to hold their cultural biases in check. See, e.g., HENRY McDONALD, THE NORMATIVE
BASIS OF CULTURE 2 (1986). Seegenerally JOHN BRENKMAN, CULTURE AND DOMINATION 42-45 (1987)
(discussing the conflict between interpretive and explanatory understanding and the intersubjectivity
involved with both).
141. See generally BERNARD, supra note 130.
142. Id. at 148. For a full review of the participant observation technique, see generally JAMES P.
SPRADLEY, PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION (1980).
143. BERNARD, supra note 130, at 152.
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exercise certain skills, such as learning the language of the subject cul-
ture,' building a memory of observations about the culture, 145 and
maintaining naivet6.' 46 This last skill seems particularly critical since this
is how the anthropologist keeps her own cultural bias from infiltrating her
observations. It may also be one of the most difficult skills to master since it
requires an otherwise knowledgeable and successful individual to exercise a
great deal of humility.
In addition to the skills that she must develop, the participant observer must
go through many stages. These span from "initial contact ' 147 to "leaving the
field.' 148 Perhaps one of the most difficult of the stages, however, is
"culture shock[, which] is an uncomfortable stress response." 49 In this stage
"nothing seems right.' 150
In contrast to the participant observer technique in which the anthropologist
is "obvious and reactive,"' the remaining three techniques require the
anthropologist to be unobtrusive and nonreactive. The first of the three, the
unobtrusive observation,' 52 is self-explanatory. The next technique, content
analysis, is "a catch-all term covering a variety of techniques for making
inferences [about the culture] from 'texts, 11113 with the word texts being
broadly construed to include fiction, nonfiction, songs, films, and other
media.154 Finally, in disguised field observation, a researcher "pretends to
actually join a group, and proceeds to record data about people in the
group."' 55 A good example of this is John Griffin's Black Like Me, which
records the shock of a white man who becomes black and lives in the South
in 1961.56
Having summarized the nature of culture and the cultural critique of law
and economics, it is possible to apply all of this to the law and economics of
discrimination. In order to fill in some background, a synopsis of the literature
on the law and economics of discrimination will be presented here, followed
by a more detailed summary.
In the law and economic analysis of discrimination, there is a critical debate
over whether market forces can dismantle a discriminatory system of
employment. Free market analysts contend that discrimination is inefficient,
144. Id. at 153.
145. Id. at 156.
146. Id. at 157.
147. Id. at 163.
148. Id. at 169.
149. Id. at 164-65.
150. Id. at ,165.
151. Id. at 271.
152. Id. The specific way in which this can be done is through "direct, reactive observation,
including continuous monitoring and spot sampling of behavior." Id. at 272.
153. Id. at 297.
154. Id. at 297-98.
155. Id. at 300.
156. Id. at 300-01. Bernard makes the point that Griffin was a journalist but that anthropologists use
the same techniques. He also cites Laud Humphreys' work in the homosexual community. Id. at 300-01,
303.
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and will therefore be driven from the market. Antidiscrimination analysts take
the opposite positiori, contending that market forces will be too slow,
incapable, or insufficient to drive out discriminating employers without the aid
of antidiscrimination laws.
This debate is informed by a critical distinction between "animus" and
"statistical" discrimination. Animus discrimination arises from an irrational
hatred or distaste for association with a particular class of individuals, usually
grouped by race or sex. Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, is
motivated by "rational" factors, such as voluntary groupings or the use of race
as a proxy for common or average characteristics.
Three major theories dominate the critical debate: Becker's competition
paradigm, Epstein's search model, and Posner's heuristic model. All three
theories provide arguments against the forcible (nonmarket) elimination of
discrimination. Becker's competition paradigm concentrates on the principle
that for the employer, animus discrimination is utility-maximizing, not
wealth-maximizing, and therefore market forces will drive out firms which
discriminate. Epstein's search model postulates that prospective employees
will search out the maximum wealth situation for themselves, and the
difference between opportunities available with and without antidiscrimination
laws will be negligible. Although his theory recognizes that some discrimina-
tion will not be driven from the marketplace, Epstein equates efficiency with
desirability, and so considers desirable that which remains. Posner's heuristic
model concerns itself primarily with the efficiency and desirability of
statistical discrimination as a heuristic aid in selecting from among applicants.
Two theories challenge these three theories. First, Donohue's acceleration
of benefits theory argues that society would prefer to have the benefits of
antidiscrimination sooner rather than later, and therefore antidiscrimination
laws are justified. Second, McAdams applies a relative social preference
theory to conclude that discrimination is the search for relative social
status-arguing, among other things, that the stigma of discrimination is,
therefore, readily understandable. Parts II.C and II.D will provide further
detail on all of these theories.
C. Pro-Free Market Law & Economic Theories of Discrimination
1. Becker's Neoclassical Model of Discrimination
The neoclassic model of employment discrimination suggests that the
market will eliminate discriminatory employers. 57 One variation of the
model is Becker's competition paradigm, which posits that discrimination
157. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971). Similar theories
based on Becker's model can be found in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992), and
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 651-63 (4th ed. 1992). The Becker model of
discrimination is alive and well. See Cooter, supra note 4. Note, however, the broadest theoretical
challenge to that model in McAdams, supra note 4, (manuscript at 43-45, 98-104).
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occurs as a result of individual preferences, or "tastes."' 8 For example, one
person may have a taste for nonassociation with members of another race, so
that contact with those individuals imposes nonpecuniary costs-lost
utility.'59 This results in the avoidance of valuable transactions which would
involve such contact. Society as a whole suffers a loss because these efficient
transactions never occur, so their potential gain is never realized. 60 This
inefficient state is at disequilibrium because the market will favor those actors
who are responsive to the market rather than shackled to nonpecuniary
preferences. Employers who discriminate will pass up more highly qualified
employees for lesser qualified employees merely to satisfy their nonpecuniary
preferences. As these inefficient, discriminating employers are forced from the
market by the more efficient, nondiscriminating employers, society will move
toward a higher-producing, more efficient state of equilibrium.'6'
Becker laments the black radical position that blacks should avoid contact
or competition with the white world because he believes that it will only
result in the loss of additional beneficial trades while not yielding any
measurable gains.
62
2. Epstein's Variation on the Neoclassical Theory
Epstein's model considers the problems of both animus and statistical
discrimination. 63 Epstein accepts the neoclassical theory that all animus
discrimination is undesirable and will be removed by market forces, and
distinguishes animus from statistical discrimination which, he concedes, will
not be responsive to market pressures. 64 He argues, however, that statistical
discrimination is desirable and therefore, its invulnerability to market forces
is not a flaw of the free-market model.
65
In analyzing animus discrimination, Epstein supplements Becker's theory
with his search paradigm: essentially, all workers are free to offer their
services to employers and to continue to search until they maximize their job
opportunities. 66 While discrimination may limit the opportunities of some
groups, on the whole the best opportunities available will not vary widely. As
one group is turned away repeatedly, their value rises compared to the
remaining workers in the pool, until the group is eventually selected.6 7
Epstein accepts that free market forces will not eliminate all discrimination,
acknowledging that statistical discrimination will remain, and going so far as
158. BECKER, supra note 157, at 11-12.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 39-47.
162. Id. at 24.
163. EPsTEiN, supra note 157, at 28-78.
164. Statistical discrimination can be viewed as an effective counter to Becker's neoclassical model
because if discrimination is efficient it will not be eliminated by market forces.
165. EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 66-68.
166. Id. at 31-32.
167. Id.
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to say that such discrimination is desirable. 6 ' He argues that places of
business will become racially stratified because of natural affinities, language
similarities, and preferences of music, food, holidays, etc.' 69 This stratifica-
tion is desirable because it reduces conflict resolution costs, 7 0 allows
individuals to avoid distasteful associations, I7 ' and allows for informal
enforcement of promises. 2
3. Posner's Heuristic Model of Statistical Discrimination
Posner's heuristic model suggests that some statistical discrimination results
merely from employers using race as a proxy for other characteristics.'
7 1
This proxy occurs when information costs are so high that employers find it
economical to decrease the applicant pool by employing stereotypes to make
hiring decisions. As an illustration, Posner suggests that if average black
productivity is less than average white productivity, employers might pay
blacks a lower wage than whites, although any particular black individual may
have average or above-average productivity. 74
This view of discrimination counters Becker's neoclassical model. If
discrimination is efficient, it will not be eliminated by market forces, as these
forces merely serve efficiency. However, Posner offers statistical discrimina-
tion as proof that there is no economic justification for antidiscrimination
laws, which would necessarily eliminate this efficient form of discrimina-
tion.17
5
D. Antidiscrimination Law & Economic Theories of Discrimination
1. Donohue's Acceleration of Benefits Theory
One response to Becker's neoclassic model is Donohue's acceleration of
benefits theory, which accepts Becker's paradigm but argues from within it
that antidiscrimination laws are desirable. Considering that the ideal state is
the nondiscriminating society, t71 the benefit yielded by antidiscrimination
168. Id. at 66-68. For a contrasting view, see the discussion of the costs of statistical discrimination
infra at Part II.D.4.
169. EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 62.
170. Id. at 63. One example of conflict resolution Epstein suggests is choice of music: he assumes
that if the employees are monoracial, they will have no difficulty in selecting background music for their
business setting.
171. Id. at 68. Other authors have noted that respecting such illegitimate preferences risks lending
them implicit approval. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing
Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1992).
172. EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 69-71.
173. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513, 516
(1987).
174. Id.
175. See POSNER; supra note 157, at 657-60. But see infra parts II.D-E (outlining conflicting opinions
of the efficiency of statistical discrimination).
176. More than merely a normative valuation, the nondiscriminatory society is favorable from the
standpoint of efficiency: because discrimination (in Becker's paradigm) is inefficient, a more efficient
system will result in a pareto advantage.
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laws is that this nondiscriminatory state of affairs is reached more quickly
than would otherwise be possible.'
In his analysis, Donohue borrows the turnpike theorem from optimal growth
theory: the turnpike may take one a bit out of the way at first, but in the long
run it is likely to save time.' To make an empirical analysis, he balances
the short-term costs against the long-term gains, and concludes that the
antidiscrimination laws yield an overall benefit.'79 In addition, antidiscrimi-
nation laws provide a normative good: the weight of discriminatory ineffi-
ciency, previously borne by all, is now borne exclusively by the discrimina-
tors. '8
Posner argues that Donohue's efficiency analysis of the acceleration of
benefits theory may be incorrect because it fails to consider the administrative
costs and added inefficiencies associated with driving out the discriminators
at a faster speed-distorting the natural process. 8' Posner relies on an
analogy to a shipping company which has discovered a new technology
allowing it to build faster, more efficient vessels. He points out that scrapping
the current, out-dated ships is not economically efficient; it is more logical to
gradually phase them out.
82
Donohue defends the acceleration of benefits theory by making a distinction
between situations where sunk costs exist and those situations where they do
not. 83 He argues that Posner's accelerative inefficiencies are phantom costs:
the disequilibrium (discriminatory) position is inefficient and the equilibrium
position is efficient.Thus, the sooner society progresses from one to the other,
the better.'8 4 To counter Posner's analogy, he points out that if the ships had
no cost, there would be no argument for continuing to use them. 85 This
analogy is better applied to employment discrimination, he argues, because
driving employers from the market is more like choosing between chartering
ships and chartering airplanes: if the airplanes are cheaper and quicker, there
is no reason to hire a ship. Similarly, since society has no investments in
discriminating employers, and nondiscriminating employers are more
desirable, it would be logical to choose to patronize the latter over the
former.8 6
177. John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1422 (1986).
178. Id. at 1431.
179. Id. at 1423-30.
180. Id. at 1429.
181. Posner, supra note 173, at 513-14.
182. Id. at 515.
183. John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to
Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 526 (1987).
184. Id. at 525-27.
185. Id. at 526.
186. See id.
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2. Relative Social Preference Theory
A second theory which disputes the neoclassical model is the relative social
preference theory.'17 This theory maintains that people are not driven by
absolute tastes, but rather by a desire for commodities which give utility in
a relative, rather than absolute, setting. 8 8 This competition for relative
position occurs on both an individual and a group scale-in this case within
racial groups. 8 9 The idea behind the relative social preference theory was
developed as a response to Becker's household production theory, which
argued that traditional consumer theory failed to address much behavior
because it considered "tastes" to be a black box which precluded further
analysis. 9 ° In response to this attack, Becker developed a new theory, which
separates goods and commodities. 19 His neoclassic discrimination analysis,
however, suffers from the same flaws the household production theory was
designed to address.'92
The action of one group in discriminating is not blindly accepted as the
result of an irrational taste, but rather is seen as an attempt to produce the
commodity of improved group status. McAdams offers two reasons why this
view of discrimination is more desirable than the neoclassical view. 93 The
first is a set of empirical studies showing that this phenomenon occurs even
in groups assembled solely for the purposes of study. This suggests that when
the groups come together voluntarily on the basis of perceived similarities, the
effect would be even stronger.
194
The second argument for the relative social preference theory is the idea
that it performs more consistently than the neoclassic model in predicting
discriminatory behavior. '95 Under the latter, the behavior of whites in the
segregated South was incomprehensible. What taste could account for why
they would oppose using the same luncheonette, bathroom, or drinking
fountain as blacks, while simultaneously employing them as domestic help to
clean their belongings, cook their food, and rear their children? Why would
these tastes extend to opposing interracial marriages or black politicians, when
these people would most likely never be encountered? These same problems
are easily explained by relative preferences. Whites would not tolerate
associations that would impute equal or superior status to blacks; only those
187. Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992); see also McAdams, supra
note 4, (manuscript at 94-96).
188. McAdams, supra note 187, at 3-5. The principal idea is that people's desires are not
independent: they may interact either positively (empathy or altruism) or negatively (status-seeking or
looking to obtain a position superior to others). In the context of the relative social preference theory,
discrimination is seen as a negatively interdependent preference. Id.
189. Id. at 93.
190. See id. at 95 (citing George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,
67 AM. ECON. RaV. 76, 84, 88 (1977)).
191. Id. at 94.
192. Id. at 95.
193. Id. at 96.
194. Id. at 96-97.
195. Id. at 97-98.
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associations which indicated lower status were acceptable.' 96 In short, these
whites behaved "as if' they were aware of their relative preferences.
This model suggests that discriminatory harm is manifested as stigma to the
individual and overall economic loss to society. The former is the result of the
all or nothing nature of the relative preference: If the competing groups were
equal, there would be no stigma attached to being associated with any group.
But because minority groups may be ostracized from the society by a
majority, they may be fully deprived of the commodity of social status.'97
Black activists respond to this deprivation by arguing that blacks should
have no contact with whites. Becker's argument against this position is that
blacks would lose all transactions, rather than merely the ones which
discriminatory whites would refuse them.' 98 Yet, by a different measure
blacks gain; blacks are removed from the relative social status competition.
Since blacks are no longer involved in the zero-sum struggle to be white,
blacks can invest these resources in making absolute gains. This results in
"empowerment," strength turned inward to build and strengthen, rather than
outward to fight conflict.' 99
The relative social preference theory responds to Posner's Cosean analysis
by positing that the analysis is wholly inapplicable in this situation. Where
relative social status is at stake, a worker cannot bribe his employer because
the very nature of bribing causes a loss of relative social status. Thus, it may
be more advantageous to a black who seeks this relative status to remain at
an all-black firm for $75 per day rather than switch to a firm which will pay
him $90 per day but pays white workers $100 per day. In this situation, a law
which compels the latter firm to hire the black worker at $100 per day will
earn him more than the $10 per day it will cost the firm. 00 In addition to
this individual gain, society will gain from the elimination of wasteful relative
preference competition.
Discrimination causes harm to society when resources are expended in
pursuit of relative preferences."0 ' The competition itself will result in a zero
196. Id.
197. Id. at 98.
198. BECKER, supra note 157, at 24.
199. See McAdams, supra note 187, at 98-99.
200. For a fliller discussion, see id. at 100-01.
201. Id. at 21. McAdams illustrates this with a prisoner's dilemma. Assume two mines: a dirty mine
with a wage of $200 per week and a clean mine with a wage of $150 per week. Two miners, A and B,
each with a relative preference for earning more than the other, and each desiring to work in a clean
mine, must choose employment independently. Each miner ranks his preferences as follows (ranked
from most desirable to least, with the miner's view of the situation in parentheses):
(1) Work in dirty mine, other in clean one (win).
(2) Both work in clean mine (tie).
(3) Both work in dirty mine (tie).
(4) Work in clean mine, other in dirty one (lose).
A examines his choices and realizes that he would rather work in the dirty mine regardless of whether
B works in the clean mine ((1) is preferable to (2)) or the dirty mine ((3) is preferable to (4)). B's
analysis is similar, so both miners end up in situation (3), when they would both rather be in (2), which
would yield a Pareto benefit: increased health with no loss of relative preferences. As a whole, they have
suffered a loss as a result of their competition, defining this situation as a zero-sum game.
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sum, 202 so any resources spent in its furtherance will be wasted, and society
will be the poorer for it.
One difficulty with the relative social preference theory is the concept of
free riders-if it is easier for each individual in the group to enjoy the
benefits of the work others have done, no one will take responsibility for the
work.2"' Two points counteract the free rider problem, however. First, in
some situations, discrimination will not result in transaction costs. This is the
situation when an employer is faced with choosing between two equally
qualified applicants; since only one can be selected, rejecting the one not from
the employer's group will be costless.20 4 Second, groups have an effective
means to discourage free riders: awarding status within the group. The group
bestows elevated intragroup status upon individuals who positively elevate the
group's status-through business success or fame, for instance-while
lowering the status of those who do not contribute. Those who cannot raise
the group's status level through positive achievements do so by lowering the
status of other groups. This theory is borne out by the apparent inverse
relationship between racial prejudice and personal achievement.20 5
3. Further Responses to Epstein's Search Model
There are four more minor objections to Epstein's search model. First, there
are practical considerations and distributive issues. In reality, entry to the
employment marketplace involves a point of entry disparity-where is each
individual's point of entry? 20 6 Also, this analysis involves some distributive
questions: Epstein's implicit appeal to the freedom of contract for all is an
empty appeal in a world in which those who are equally talented and equally
willing to work do not have an equal opportunity to do so. 20 7 Unfortunately,
Epstein fails miserably to consider the issues of rectification that are made
patent by such disequality. 25 Indeed, in a truly unlibertarian manner, he
appears to oppose the making of reparations to the descendants of slaves.20 9
Further, at least one author has suggested that modern business systems may
be so complicated that the simple two-party models used by neoclassic
economics cannot accurately predict business behavior.2 " The problem is
that middle managers often have the power to hire and fire workers, but are
insulated from the influence which would be produced by greater or lesser
202. For an example of this zero-sum game, see supra note 201.
203. McAdams, supra note 187, at 99.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Samuel Issacharoff, ContractualLiberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1219,
1230-33 (1992) (arguing that in the pre-1964 South, it was nearly impossible for "blacks to acquire a
'normal distribution' of talents in such specialized professions as, for example, medicine, engineering,
or law").
207. George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1463, 1468 (1992).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1469.
210. Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment by David
Strauss, 79 GEo. L.J. 1695, 1696-97 (1991).
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profits. Because they have more contact with workers hired, they may be
more interested in indulging their discriminatory preferences than saving the
corporation's profits.21'
Second, there are disincentives for investment in human capital. Similar to
the argument against statistical discrimination,212 there is an argument that
animus discrimination also poses a disincentive to invest in human capital.
The argument rests on economic grounds: discrimination in a certain
occupation restricts rewards available for investment in training for that
occupation, so groups discriminated against should invest less in that area. As
discrimination becomes broader, the disincentives increase as well.
21 3
Third, in employment discrimination situations, as in the pollution scenarios,
transaction costs will prevent the market from reaching the efficient state.214
Finally, there is the preference shaping analysis. Because the law shapes
individual preferences, it must not lend validity to discriminatory preferences.
Governmental power should be exercised with humility and caution, but when
it acts, preferences may soften over time, thereby reducing the psychological
costs to those who would otherwise discriminate.2 5
4. Further Responses to Posner's and Epstein's
Statistical Discrimination
Several commentators have advanced ideas which suggest that while it may
be advantageous to the individual firm, statistical discrimination is harmful to
society. For instance, Donohue suggests that allowing employers to use racial
proxies rather than forcing them to evaluate individuals creates disincentives
for individuals to invest in human capital.21 6 An example is when blacks, on
the average, score thirty points lower on a standardized exam which is related
to job performance. If employers dismiss black applicants on the basis of this
statistic, there is little or no incentive for a black student to invest time or
energy in improving his score on the exam. The result of this loss of human
capital is borne by society in general, which is deprived of the benefits which
flow from an investment in human capital.
A second flaw in allowing employers to use race as a proxy for individual
traits or abilities is the theory of compensatory justice.1 7 This idea posits
that any average or stereotypical inferiority of blacks is a consequence of
slavery and historical injustice. As a result, society has an obligation to
211. Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 157, at 658 (arguing that in other contexts, such as selling
homes, integrating schools, and permitting hotel stays, there is an inverse relationship between the
degree of interpersonal contact and the willingness to suspend discriminatory attitudes).
212. For a discussion of the costs of statistical discrimination, see infra text accompanying note 224.
213. See Issacharoff, supra note 206, at 1223 (discussing Cass Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop
Discrimination, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 23, 29 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1991)).
214. Donohue, supra note 171, at 1588.
215. Id. at 1591.
216. See Donohue, supra note 183, at 532-33.
217. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination, 79 GEo. W. 1619, 1627-
29 (1991).
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correct this wrong by providing affirmative action until those traces of
injustice have been erased. The laws of the market can be expected to effect
justice only by allowing all individuals to begin on an equal footing. 2,8
A final criticism is that allowing statistical discrimination will cause racial
stratification and demoralization to worsen. 9 This action brands a particular
race as inferior, injures its economic well-being, and deprives qualified
applicants of employment opportunities.
E. A Cultural Critique of the Law & Economics of Discrimination
In this Subpart, I provide a cultural and phenomenological critique of the
law and economics of discrimination. I do so first by contextualizing the
discussion by providing some biographical information and relaying one of my
personal experiences with racism. I hope the reader will indulge me. Second,
on the basis of this information and the analysis I have conducted up to this
point, I provide a list of selected cultural criticisms of the law and economics
of discrimination. Throughout my discussion, I make references to Richard
Epstein and Richard Posner. Let me emphasize at this point that although I
disagree vehemently with their respective positions on the law and economics
of discrimination, I happen to think very highly of both of these individuals
and of their contributions to the law. Indeed, I have gone on record regarding
my opinion of Judge Posner's work.22 °
1. Contextualizing Race Discrimination
Here is the individual I am.22' I am a black male in my middle thirties.
Culturally, I was born in Haiti, I immigrated to the United States at the age
218. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2080, 2085 (1992).
219. See John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79
GEO. L.J. 1713, 1724-28 (1991).
220. See, e.g., Linz Audain, Of Posner, and Newton, and Twenty-First Century Law: An Economic
and Statistical Analysis of the Posner Rule for Granting Preliminary Injunctions, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1215 (1990).
221. The reader should note that in pursuing this particular kind of autobiographical contextuali-
zation, I follow the lead of those critical race theory proponents who argue that minority legal scholars
should bring autobiographical examples into their legal analyses. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Academic
Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991);
Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal
Academy, 77 VA. L. REv. 539 (1991). Of course, Patricia Williams' classic story of being denied
admission into a Benetton store is an example of this genre that is often discussed. See PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991); see also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 835-38
(1993).
Several of my colleagues who commented on a previous draft of this Article, noticed the dramatic
change in my "voice," and the highly personal and emotional nature of the incidents related in this
portion of the Article. Let me make two points about that comment. First, in reading my cultural
critique, my colleagues experienced exactly what I intended them to experience-the intensity of my
feelings about racism. Although we all, of course, have intense feelings, we just have those feelings
about different things and experiences. The point I make in this Article is that the economic analysts
who purport to model my cultural reality need to step into my shoes and understand my feelings before
they put the math and models to paper. Second, all is not lost: at the end of my critique, I return to my
objective-sounding/law professor voice for the remainder of the Article.
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of six, and I speak French and Creole with native fluency and my Spanish is
passable. I was raised in a Haitian household but have been influenced by
African-American, European-American, and Hispanic-American norms and
values. I have been particularly influenced by the Haitian norm of individual
achievement. Therefore, despite being born and raised in relative poverty, I
have, by many standards, succeeded. I am an accomplished classically-trained
vocalist and a good pianist. I am also a good athlete, actor, and acceptable
martial artist. I have won academic awards, scholarships and fellowships, and
membership in honorary societies. I have amassed a high number of degrees
from some of America's most outstanding universities. I hold a job at one of
America's better law schools.
Getting to this point in my life, however, has been fraught with difficulties.
Casual conversations with my white male colleagues reveals that I have either
been fired or failed to receive job offers from a disproportionate number of
jobs. It also seems that my colleagues and I have been subject to different
standards of job-related acceptable behaviors in our lives. Oh, and the police:
I have lost count of the number of times I have been stopped, questioned,
asked for identification, and had mug shots taken of me. Some of my white
male colleagues have never had a single such experience. Oh, and the people:
I have lost count of the number of times I have had white people clutch
belongings, assume I was the janitor or the help, 2 write me anonymous
"nigger" notes or "inform" me about my animalistic origins or sexual
proclivities, or pretend that I wasn't there.
Neither does being at this point in my life insulate me from any of this
garbage. I shall relate a single experience. It is the fall of 1990. A woman I
am trying to impress and I have gone to the eastern shore of Maryland for a
romantic weekend together. We arrive in the late afternoon on Friday, and
spend the balance of the afternoon and early evening driving around town
sightseeing. We find our bed and breakfast and check in for the weekend. The
couple running the establishment seems friendly enough, so we ask them for
recommendations for dinner. They inform us that the best but also most
expensive place is a restaurant affiliated with a boat club on the outskirts of
town. We call the restaurant and confirm that no reservations are necessary
and that they stop seating at 10:00 p.m.
We arrive at the restaurant. It is 8:45 p.m. when we walk through the front
doors. The first thing I notice is that although there are quite a number of
people in the restaurant, there are absolutely no people of color, anywhere. At
this point, we are still two feet from the entrance to the restaurant. A white
woman stands at a lectern approximately five to six feet from us. She looks
at us, does not smile, and says nothing. She turns around, looks at the
bartender, and then looks at a white man who is wearing a dark suit. She
steps away from the lectern. The man in the suit steps forward.
222. See generally Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989)
(defining as microaggressions those "'subtle, stunning, often automatic... exchanges'... [that amount
to] 'incessant and cumulative' assaults on black self-esteem") (footnotes omitted).
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The man in the dark suit informs us that the restaurant stopped seating
fifteen minutes ago. The blood begins to rush.to my head. I try to remain
calm and in my most controlled voice, I protest. I tell him that we called and
were told that the restaurant stopped seating at 10:00 p.m. He then tells me
that they had underestimated the demand, and on this particular night the
restaurant is lacking several items on the menu. There is, however, another
restaurant "across the bridge" that will be able to accommodate us. At this
point, my palms are cold and my breathing is heavy. I am truly outraged,
ready for a physical confrontation. For, not only has this man insulted,
degraded, and humiliated me and the intelligence that I have spent all of my
life trying to develop, he has done so in the presence of a woman whom I am
trying to impress.223 How dare he? It is a long, lonely, and silent moment
as I stare icily at this man and weigh my options. I wheel about. My date and
I exit the restaurant.
The gauntlet has been laid down. In the parking lot, I notice a black
dishwasher who is emptying the trash. I approach her. I tell her to go inside
the restaurant and tell her boss: (a) I know what he's doing; (b) my date and
I are going to walk back inside that restaurant and we will be seated; and
(c) if we are not seated, I am a lawyer, and I will sue the restaurant for every
penny it has. She enters the restaurant, and reemerges. She tells me that we
should go back inside the restaurant. After we are seated, I notice a second
white man in a dark suit staring at us. He hurriedly approaches the first white
man in a dark suit. They huddle. There is much nodding and looking in our
direction. They separate. There are no apologies. As the evening progresses
I notice that white couple after white couple entering the restaurant is seated
by the woman at the lectern without incident. So, a small victory. But the
weekend is ruined because we are both depressed and apprehensive. My God,
when will this madness end?
2. The Name of It All
First of all, who made up this name-the law and economics of discrimina-
tion-anyway? Discrimination is a nice clinical term to describe what some
people would like to believe they are doing. But "discriminated against" is not
what I feel. I feel oppressed. This guy doesn't even know my name and right
off the bat he tells me I'm not worthy to sit and have a meal in a restaurant
of this quality. I feel insulted, degraded, and humiliated. You bet I take it
personally. So would Richard Epstein; or Richard Posner. They would know
of no other way to take it but personally. Neither do I. When I do take it
personally, many phrases come to mind. "Discriminated against" is not one
of them.
223. One colleague, Adrienne Davis, has astutely pointed out to me the gendered nature of this story.
What happened here was that while in the act of displaying my peacock feathers, I had been
"unpeacocked" by another male. A most disconcerting (male) event.
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3. Statistical vs. Animus Discrimination
Oh, you mean he was practicing statistical and not animus discrimination?
Well gee, that makes me feel so much better. For a second there I thought it
might have been animus discrimination. Now that I know it was only
statistical, that surely makes my pain go away. Who came up with that
distinction anyway? It seems to be a distinction without a difference. Does the
pain in my psyche know or care that it is statistical and not animus discrimi-
nation? The effect is the same. Oh, but he was being efficient and rational.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that he was-so was Hitler. Exactly how
informative is that observation to the problem at hand?
In this context, those words-statistical, animus, efficient, rational-are very
far away from my experience; indeed, they are an entire culture apart. Since
I am an economist, I understand those words in any other context. But from
my standpoint as a member of the subculture of detrimental "deindividuali-
zation, the words look like an elaborate smoke screen, intentionally or
unintentionally contrived, to justify some pretty odious behavior. No, it is not
okay because it is "just" statistical discrimination. All that characterization
does is to perpetuate the deindividualization. Iam the individual who has been
intentionally harmed. To call it statistical is to involuntarily place me into an
arbitrary group and to justify harming me on that basis. In no other body of
law is that done. This man must be forced to deal with me-person to person.
Of course, to call it statistical and therefore desirable (A la Epstein).24 for
me and my date to suffer this kind of harm, is-well I won't say what I think
about that observation.
Then again, this is not even good statistics, let alone efficient decision-
making. Neither Posner nor Epstein seem to have an appreciation for how
much deindividualization biases the process of statistical inference. For
example, let us assume that a white male employer has had a string of five
bad white male employees from an employee pool containing an equal number
of black and white workers. The employer does not say: "Oh, those white
guys are bad workers." He says: "I guess I'm having some bad luck." That is
beneficial deindividualization.225 The white workers get the benefit of the
doubt. Assume that the same employer has a string of three good black
workers and two or even one bad black worker. Conclusion? Of course,
"everybody knows it," those blacks are bad workers. "I had a string of good
224. See the discussion supra at Part II.C.2. The magnitude of the statistical bias that my date and
I experienced is well illustrated by a conversation that I had with Jerome Culp of Duke University about
an earlier draft of this Article. After reading that draft, Jerome insisted that I had to identify the race of
my companion. I agreed to do that with neither of us discussing why that was important. We did not
have to. Both of us knew that if my companion had been a white woman then the statistical bias would
have worked "in my favor" and I would have been validated as a "socially acceptable" black, worthy
of a seat in the restaurant. This did not happen, however, because my companion was a woman of color.
By no stretch of the imagination should this footnote be construed as a diatribe against interracial dating
or mating. See, e.g., supra note 112. The footnote merely addresses the manner and virulence with
which "statistical discrimination" operates.
225. See supra part I.C.1.
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luck for a while there. It has run out, so I don't think I'll hire one again."
That is the nature of detrimental deindividualization. It creates a statistical
bias against the arbitrarily defined group that is so deeply entrenched and
accepted that it isn't even questioned. Indeed, even some black employers
engage in it. It is obviously not efficient.
4. The Market Will Drive Out Discrimination
Say what? You have to be kidding me. Richard Epstein, sure I believe in
the marketjust like the next guy. But did you see what that guyjust did to me
and my date? He was "discriminating" precisely because of the market. So
what the hell do you mean the market will drive out discrimination? And this
is what is being done to my face over whether I get to sit down and have
dinner. God only knows what has gone on behind closed doors when I have
not gotten, or was fired from, jobs.
So let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the market could have
driven this discriminatory restaurant out of business. What would you have
done, Richard, waited for the market? Right. Richard, I have seen you rant
and rave at conferences when people have dared to disagree with your ideas,
let alone insult your dignity or your manhood. I am willing to guess that a
guy of your persistence and intellectual skill would not have allowed that
restaurant owner to live. And that is just one incident in a lifetime of
detrimental deindividualization. So should I wait for the market every time?
I don't think so. Of course, under your scheme, Richard, not only would my
date and I have been insulted, but we would have had no recourse at all
because the civil rights laws would not exist.2 6
5. Some Cross-Cultural Education
True, if I held an endowed chair at the University of Chicago Law
School, 27 I too would find it hard to believe that there were aspects of the
American cultural fabric that I did not fully appreciate. But that is indeed the
difficult part of cross-cultural study: the humility required to submerge one's
bias and open one's mind exacts a heavy toll-especially on those who are
highly accomplished intellectually. 228 For example, in arguing that the
workplace would become racially stratified because of natural affinities,
language similarities, holidays, etc., 2 9 Richard Epstein clearly does not
appreciate the difference between the subculture of detrimental deindividuali-
zation (e.g., "blackness") and African-American culture.
226. Dismantling the antidiscrimination laws is the natural end product of Epstein's argument: since
the laws distort the operation of the market, and prevent "desirable" statistical discrimination, they are
inefficient and undesirable. See supra part II.C.2.
227. Richard Epstein is the holder of the James Parker Hall chair at the University of Chicago Law
School.
228. See supra text accompanying note 140.
229. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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Richard, "black" people are people from all cultures and walks of life who
have been lumped together into this category by a stupid idea ("race") that
stipulates that human beings can be segregated on the basis of external
physical appearance, and arbitrarily announces that pigmentation of skin-not
thumb size, or hair color, or earlobe size, or eye color-is the most important
basis for that segregation. To test this idea, Richard, just open the phone book
and find the synagogue where the "black" Jewish23 ° congregation worships,
and visit it. I would guess that there, you will find people who have a much
higher "language" and "holiday" affinity to you than they do to me despite
our "racial" similarity. While you're at it, you might want to subscribe to
Ebony or Jet or Hispanic. Get a sense for the contextualization of racial
oppression in America. And, since I know that you are a person of good faith,
I know that you will allow yourself to feel, Richard, feel, about things and
people that you may have never felt about before. Let that feeling inform your
law and economic analysis.
One more thing: we should all thank God for the Donohues23" ' and
McAdamses232 of the world.
III. CRITICAL CULTURAL LAW & ECONOMICS - LAW & ECONOMICS
A. The Method of CCL&Ec-L
In contrast to CCL&Ec-C, where culture informs law and economic
analysis, CCL&Ec-L is law and economic analysis informing culture. There
are at least two questions that arise in connection with CCL&Ec-L. The first
question is how one might go about performing CCL&Ec-L. The second
question is why one might expect the performing of CCL&Ec-L to be a
fruitful exercise. Each will be taken in turn.
First, how might CCL&Ec-L provide its critique of a legal problem situated
in another culture or subculture? There are at least two ways in which this
might occur. In the first method, the legal or law-related problem is
characterized using principles of cultural analysis. The cultural analysis is
then characterized in terms of principles of economic analysis. In the second
method, the legal or law-related problem situated in another culture is directly
characterized using principles of economic analysis. I am assuming that
principles of economic analysis are universal and can therefore be pressed into
the service of cross-cultural analysis.
230. I do not believe tat this statement deindividualizes Professor Epstein. As an alumnus of the
University of Chicago Law School, I have anecdotal information which suggests that Professor Epstein
has strong associations with the Jewish culture. Once again, to be as clear as possible, I focus on
Jewishness because I understand that this is a culture that is of importance to Professor Epstein. It is
not my intention to essentialize or stereotype Professor Epstein in any way.
23 1. For a discussion of Professor Donohue's viewpoint on the economics of racial discrimination,
see supra part II.D. I.
232. For a discussion of Professor McAdams' viewpoint on the economics of racial discrimination,
see supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
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As an example of these universal economic principles, consider that markets
have always existed and probably will always exist.233 Recently, Eastern
Bloc governments have made the political decision to stop suppressing and
indeed to encourage their markets.234 Accordingly, Western economists have
been retained by these governments to instruct them in the nature of the
appropriate universal and cross-cultural principles of economic analysis. 35
CCL&Ec-L merely represents an effort to use these universal principles to
analyze the legal dimensions of a culturally unique problem that is not located
within the traditional economic domain.
It should also be clear that CCL&Ec-L essentially advocates the export of
Western law and economic analysis as a means to analyze legal issues that
arise within non-Western or Third World societies. True, in the analysis
below, I use CCL&Ec-L to analyze a legal problem-the efficacy of critical
race theory-that is situated within a subculture of American culture: racial
minorities. If my international law students are any indication, however, there
is great interest in exploring the extent to which principles of law and
economic analysis can be usefully applied to non-Western and Third World
societies (e.g., the economic analysis of African family law).236 Indeed, as
a native of a Third World country myself, I can attest to the utility of this
endeavor. CCL&Ec-L merely provides a vehicle for organizing and facilitating
this export of law and economic analysis. 37
Secondly, one might expect CCL&Ec-L to be a fruitful exercise because of
the strongly positivistic orientation of economic analysis. I think the answer
is the same whether one analyzes a legal problem with or without the
intermediation of cultural analysis.235 In order to fuither illuminate this
answer, it may be useful to pause and briefly consider the nature of this
-positivistic orientation.
23 9
The basic positivistic model to which most economists subscribe focuses on
the role of theories. "Theories are used in explaining observed phenomena. A
233. See generally H.J. CLAESSEN & PIEr VAN DE VELDE, EARLY STATE ECONOMICS (1988);
RICHARD HALPERN, THE POETICS OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION: ENGLISH RENAISSANCE CULTURE AND
THE GENEALOGY OF CAPITAL (1991).
234. See PAUL HOLLANDER, DECLINE AND DISCONTENT: COMMUNISM AND THE WEST TODAY
(1992); YOUNG C. KIM & GASTON J. SIGUR, ASIA AND THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM (1992). Compare
the predictions of GEORGE C. GuNs, COMMUNISM ON THE DECLINE (1956) (diagnosing symptoms of
demoralization, a discredited system, incurable evils, and the imminent failure of Soviet socialism).
235. See, e.g., Patrick Howe, Peace Corps Pair Means Business in Russia, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Nov. 21, 1992, at IA; Arnold R. Isaacs, International Learning to Deal in Amerikanski, WASH. POST,
Aug. 1, 1993, at RIO; Donald Smith, Peace Corps Volunteers Teach Russians the Rudiments of
Capitalism Economics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at A8; Harry Stainer, Peace Corps to Help Baltic
States, Russia, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 15, 1992, at 4B.
236. This paper is in the works with one of my African L.L.M. students.
237. This will definitely be exporting. Law and economics is almost completely an American, British,
Canadian, and Australian phenomenon. I am unaware of the existence of a sizeable body of law and
economics scholarship extending beyond the Anglo/American jurisprudential systems.
238. This is a reference to the two methods of conducting CCL&Ec-L--with or without cultural
intermediation, discussed above.
239. This is a continuation of the discussion of positivism found above. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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successful theory enables us to predict behavior."240 Theories are composed
of assumptions, variables, and hypotheses.2 4' Assumptions reflect what one
chooses to believe for purposes of the theory or the conditions under which
the theory holds.2 42 The validity of assumptions depends not so much on
their intrinsic truthfulness, but on the theory's ability to predict.243 Variables
are magnitudes that take on different values and may be explained within the
theory.2 " Finally, the hypothesis is a statement of the relationship which is
said to exist among the variables.245 Ideally, both the hypothesis and the
predictions flowing from it can be falsified by appealing to the evidence.246
It is true that this basic positivistic model has been challenged by philoso-
247 248bphers of science   and by some within the economics discipline.
However, in economics, at least, the basic positivistic model has not been
supplanted by any other model.249 These challenges, therefore, need not be
addressed in order to answer the question of why CCL&Ec-L may prove to
be a fruitful exercise.
The answer is that in the case where one uses economics to analyze the
cultural analysis of a legal or law-related problem, economics can be said to
provide an analytical dimension that cultural anthropology does not. The
phenomenological nature of the methodology of cultural anthropology requires
that its practitioners focus on observations and description of observa-
tions.250 This phenomenology provides the basis for the "biased use of
theory" critique of CCL&Ec-C.2 1' Conversely, CCL&Ec-L provides a
critique of cultural analysis in the form of a rigorous economic theory that
supplements the description provided by cultural analysis. The rigor of the
economic analysis is made possible especially because of the almost axiomatic
240. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 129, at 19.
241. Id. at 19-20.
242. Id. at 20-21.
243. Id. at 21.
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id. at 21.
246. Id. at 22.
247. See, e.g., GEOFFREY SAMUEL, MIND, BODY AND CULTURE: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE
BIOLOGICAL INTERFACE (1990). The basic idea here is that there are very few scholars who believe that
all of the things stated in the paragraph describing logical positivism can be, need to be, or are actually
done. See, for example, MANIcAS, supra note 2, at 243, for an extensive listing of various philosophers
of science and the various points on which they have departed from the classical logical positivists'
position. This does not imply that one must jettison logical positivism entirely. It implies only that the
classical model is an ideal, the conditions of which are rarely completely met.
248. See, e.g., H.L. BHATIA, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (4th ed. 1985); JOHN M. FERGUSON,
LANDMARKS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (2d ed. 1950); THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (Mark
Blaug ed., 1990); JORG NIEHANS, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY: CLASSIC CONTRIBUTIONS, 1720-
1980 (1990).
249. My armchair empirical basis for this statement is that the traditional positivistic model described
above is still the model that is taught to most beginning economics students. See, e.g., WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (4th ed. 1988); GREAT IDEAS FOR
TEACHING ECONOMICS (Ralph T. Byrns & Gerald W. Stone eds., 4th ed. 1989); CAMPBELL R.
MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES (9th ed. 1984); PAUL SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM D. NORDHAuS, ECONOMICS (13th ed. 1989).
250. See supra note 134.
251. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
nature of some of the assumptions of economic analysis (e.g., people respond
to incentives), as well as the mathematical form of many economic hypo-
theses.252
The reason for suggesting that phenomenology be tempered with positivism,
the objective of CCL&Ec-L, is the same reason for suggesting that positivism
be tempered with phenomenology. That is, it is clear that no single system of
obtaining knowledge can lay claim to consistently obtaining knowledge under
all circumstances, or even under circumstances peculiar to it. Put differently,
the price of truth is the tolerance of error.253 Therefore, it seems appropriate
to suggest that the objective of obtaining knowledge is achieved most
effectively when the use of one system of obtaining knowledge is tempered
by the use of a competing system.
Of course, instead of tempering the phenomenology of a cultural analysis
of a legal problem, CCL&Ec-L can directly provide an economic analysis of
a cross-cultural legal problem. This is very simply the application of
principles of economic analysis to law, but this time to law of a different
culture. This analysis would involve the use and application of the principles
that law and economics scholars have developed over the past fifty years.254
B. Application: A Cultural Analysis of the Kennedy/Bell Debate
This Subpart and the one that follows apply the form of CCL&Ec-L which
provides an economic analysis of the cultural analysis of a legal or law-related
problem. The law-related problem analyzed in this case is the debate between
Kennedy (and his supporters) and Bell/Delgado/Matsuda (and their supporters)
252. Why are mathematics and logic so important? The insight of the logical positivists was that
mathematics and logic "provide a framework in which we can move from one true factual stateinent to
another, i.e., they license inferences." MELCHERT, supra note 130, at 508. At this point, nearly all
economic academic journals are mathematical, and sometimes to a considerable degree. See, for
example, the Journal of Mathematical Economics. A course in mathematical economics is required in
virtually all graduate curricula, in addition to the mathematical content of other courses in the graduate
program (e.g., microeconomic analysis). GRADUATE STUDY IN ECONOMICS 1 (Harold F. Williamson ed.,
2d ed. 1969).
253. This is a basic epistemological and pragmatic idea (see, e.g., the discussion of fallibilism, supra
at note 130) that is often flouted. This is true perhaps because of the human desire to find panaceas. One
manifestation of the latter tendency is the phenomenon of "groupthink," in which individuals surround
themselves only with others who think like they do. The leader of the group erroneously believes that
the combined intellectual benefits of a group of individuals are being enjoyed (e.g., different intellects
able to point out errors the in reasoning and analysis of other members). This belief is erroneous because
the benefits have been eliminated either through the group membership selection process or through
overt and subtle pressures for individual group members to conform to the group's thinking. The
solution, of course, is to celebrate and encourage dissent or alternative points of view until such time
as a consensus has been reached or a decision must be made. My idea of tempering positivism with
phenomenology, and vice versa, is a reflection of this solution in another dimension. For a discussion
of groupthink, see IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHNK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOS (2d ed. 1982). Groupthink in legal settings is further explored in JAMES C. FREUND, ADVISE
AND INVENT: THE LAWYER AS COUNSELOR-STRATEGIST AND OTHER ESSAYS 28-33 (1990).
254. For an argument and illustration of principles of law and economics that are different from
principles of economics, see Audain, supra note 1, at 1038-45.
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regarding the success of critical race theory. 5 In this Subpart, I summarize
the nature of the debate, conduct a cultural analysis of the debate, and conduct
an economic analysis of that cultural analysis.
1. The Nature of the Kennedy/Bell Debate
Critical race theory has been defined as "the work of progressive legal
scholars of color 5 6 who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that
accounts for the role of racism in American law and that works toward the
elimination of racism as part of a larger goal of eliminating all forms of
subordination." '257 Historically, although this group of scholars-critical race
theorists-was not formally organized until 1989,"' one could argue that
critical race theory began with the original 1973 publication of Derrick Bell's
book on race and the law. 9
In 1989, Randall Kennedy, a black man, and at that time an untenured
member of the Harvard Law faculty, published a piece in which he challenged
what he saw as the dominant theses of critical race theory. The "exclusion
thesis ... is the belief that the intellectual contributions of scholars of color
are wrongfully ignored or undervalued. '26' The racial distinctiveness thesis
provides that the racial oppression experienced by all minority scholars will
cause them to view the world from a different perspective, a perspective that
will ultimately reveal itself in their work.26'
Kennedy noted that critical race theorists had "succeeded in making 'the
race question' a burning issue for a substantial number of persons in legal
academia. ' 262 Nevertheless,
[a]t the same time, the writings of Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda reveal
significant deficiencies-the most general of which is a tendency to evade
or suppress complications that render their conclusions problematic. Stated
bluntly, they fail to support persuasively their claims of racial exclusion or
255. Kennedy, in his article, referred to the critical race theory work of Bell, Delgado, and Matsuda.
See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745, 1760-87
(1989). It is not my intention to slight the valuable contributions of Professors Delgado and Matsuda
by shortening the reference to "Kennedy/Bell."
256. There appears to be some question as to whether the work of scholars who are not scholars of
color can qualify as critical race theory. See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 758
n.2 (noting that the definition of critical race theory makes reference only to "scholars" and not
"scholars of color").
257. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991). Delgado and Stefancic have identified
at least nine "themes" that are addressed by critical race theory scholars. See Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461-62 (1993).
258. Peller, supra note 256, at 758 n.2.
259. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992). Indeed, Delgado
and Stefancic cite the most recent edition of Bell's book in their bibliography on critical race theory.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 257, at 473.
260. Kennedy, supra note 255, at 1745-46.
261. Id. at 1746.
262. Id. at 1748.
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their claims that legal academic scholars of color produce a racially
distinctive brand of valuable scholarship.263
The response to Kennedy's article included a colloquy,2 a response to
the colloquy,"' several law review articles,2 66 and even articles in the lay
press. 67 For purposes of this Article, let me suggest that the responses to
Kennedy's article can be classified as personal or intellectual or a combina-
tion of both. The personal responses have asserted that in writing his article,
Kennedy was "insincere,"'2 68 "willing to speak for whites,' 269 and a "[trai-
tor] to his race.1270 The more intellectual responses have been various and
sundry. For example, Ball has demonstrated how Kennedy is inaccurate in
arguing that critical race theorists seek to invoke white guilt in their
work.27 ' Barnes has argued that contrary to Kennedy's assertions, minority
scholars do not seek to privilege their experience by making their perspective
explicit. "Instead, we offer an essential rejoinder to the 'false universalism'
prevalent in the myth of equality of opportunity.
2 72
Espinoza's response to Kennedy's article raises five arguments. First, she
argues that Kennedy's bias is evident since he argues that the articles of
minority scholars are not worth citing, while giving every indication that he
has not read any of them. 3 Second, Espinoza contends that the criteria
announced by law school hiring committees are mythical, since most law
school professors have not met them. 4 Third, she states that race should
(and does) count, as evidenced by the fact that Kennedy's article has received
notoriety primarily because he is black.27 5 Next, she points out that his
article increases the risk to minority scholars of publishing race conscious
work in the future.2 76 Finally, Espinoza argues that
263. Id. at 1749.
264. See Scott Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial Critique Debate, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1844 (1990).
265. Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. I
(1991).
266. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 221; Farber & Sherry, supra note 221.
267. See Brewer, supra note 264, at 1846 n.8 (citing Derrick Bell, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1990, at A30).
268. Id. at 1846 n.7 (citing Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872, 1874
n.20 (1990)).
269. Id. at 1846 (quoting Bell, supra note 267, at A30).
270. Id. n.10 (commenting that Professor Robert Williams made those remarks at a panel on New
Voices in Legal Scholarship, sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools (Sept. 8, 1989)
(videocassette on file with AALS)).
271. Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855, 1858-60
(1990).
272. Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in
Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1864, 1865 (1990) (footnote omitted) (arguing that
critical race scholars offer a rejoinder to false universalism).
273. Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1878, 1880 (1990).
274. Id. at 1882-83.
275. Id. at 1883.
276. Id. at 1885.
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Kennedy's call for individualism reinforces exclusion by delegitimizing the
commonality of the experience of othemess many minorities feel with other
minorities and express in their scholarship. Although there is much
individual divergence, focusing on the individual before we recapture that
which is our shared difference would result in a cacophony of voices
unrecognized, indecipherable, and overwhelmed by the dominant dis-
course.
277
2. A Cultural Analysis of the Kennedy/Bell Debate
I offer here a cultural analysis of both sides of the debate. At the outset, I
wish to make it clear to the reader that, based on my cultural critique of the
law and economics of discrimination, my bias is in favor of the Bell side of
the debate. I believe that minority scholars can have a unique perspective on
the law. In the text that follows, I attempt to put my bias aside to provide an
objective cultural analysis of both sides of the debate.
a. Bell's Side of the Debate
i. The Unchallenged Assumption
It is possible to characterize the response of those on the Bell side of the
debate as an impassioned attempt to validate the existence and define the
boundaries of the subculture of which they are members-detrimental
deindividualization.2  Such a response is warranted. From the standpoint of
Bell's proponents, Kennedy, by his identity and through the substance of his
statement, has struck at the very essence of the culture of detrimental
deindividualization. The tacit interpretation of Kennedy's thesis by those
minority scholars who support the Bell side is that "surely there is no
uniformity of perspective of the members of the subculture of detrimental
deindividualization. For here I, Kennedy, stand before you, a putative member
of this subculture, and not only do I not have your perspective, but I have one
that is diametrically opposed to yours."
Although the observations of the proponents of the Bell side of the debate
are possessed of great insight, their interpretation of Kennedy's critique, as
suggested above, is a fundamentally unchallenged interpretation. Consider the
personal dimension of the interpretation. As a threshold matter, that inter-
pretation fails to realize that membership within the subculture of detrimental
deindividualization is a statistical event.2 79 That is, Kennedy's outward
appearance is what is defined in Western society as "black." Yet, although the
experience of detrimental deindividualization-racism-has happened to a
high percentage of individuals who are "black," it is statistically possible that
277. Id. at 1886.
278. For a discus3ion of this activity of defining the subcultural boundaries, see supra Part I.B.2.
279. See supra note 14.
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those experiences may not have occurred to Kennedy. As another matter, even
if Kennedy has experienced detrimental deindividualization, it is conceivable
that that subculture may not be as strong-may not span as many of his social
relationships-for him as it is for other individuals."' 0 Finally, it is conceiv-
able that Kennedy has given different meaning to his experience of detrimen-
tal deindividualization because for him it is differently contextualized (e.g.,
embedded within a class subculture).28 ' In short, Randall Kennedy does and
should be allowed to speak for the individual who is Randall Kennedy. I take
issue with the substance of his views below.
ii. The Paradox of Blackness
In providing their tacit interpretation of Kennedy's work, the proponents of
the Bell side of the debate grapple with the paradox of deindividualization
and, in particular, the paradox of blackness. This paradox essentially refers
to the situation where one is forced to use racism to fight racism, where a less
pernicious form of racism involves perpetuating the myth of the "black
race." 2 2 One manifestation of the paradox in this context is the one already
alluded to: the implicit assumption that Kennedy, by virtue of the pigment of
his skin, should possess a particular point of view. The paradox inheres in the
fact that such an assumption is being invoked to fortify a subculture that seeks
to combat racism.
Another manifestation of the paradox is that the Kennedy/Bell debate may
be, at its heart, a debate about how best to deal with racism in light of the
paradox of deindividualization. Kennedy's underlying message may be that
there is a fundamental intellectual flaw in the notion that one might use
deindividualization to fight deindividualization. Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the latter is Kennedy's underlying message, then the response
of the Bell side of the debate is at best inferred. This inferred response is that
although it is true that Kennedy may have an interesting academic point, the
reality of racism is still too virulent for its victims to be concerned about
intellectual niceties. The message from Williams' battlefield analogy3
seems apropos: Kennedy, pick up your own sword or be impaled by your
enemy's-this is no time to debate the morality of the use of the sword.
Yet, the battlefield analogy both demonstrates and obfuscates. It demon-
strates the clarity with which some see the relationship between the state of
racism in America and the paradox of blackness. It obfuscates in suggesting
280. For a discussion of the strength of a subculture, see supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
281. For a discussion of contextualization and embedded subcultures, see supra text accompanying
notes 59-61.
282. See supra text accompanying note 116.
283. A summary of this story can be found in Brewer, supra note 264, at 1846 n.10 (citing Robert
Williams" Parable, Critical Race Theory Newsletter, Oct. 27, 1989, at 2). Professor Williams' parable
describes a Native American elder who is trying to negotiate a peace with the white soldiers who are
invading his land, while an unruly underling undermines the elder's position of strength by revealing
that much of that strength is merely illusory. Of course, the underling represents Kennedy, and the
Native American culture represents critical race theory.
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that the postponement of an answer to the paradox is itself an answer. The
response by Kennedy here may be that racism in its current form is not that
virulent, that there is no enemy, and that racism will continue to be with us
as long as we continue to rely on racism to fight racism. This last argument
is one reason why the paradox is so problematic. 284 Responses to these
arguments will be considered below; for now, it will be sufficient to observe
that, with limited exceptions," 5 those on the Bell side of the debate have
not fully addressed the question of how one deals with the paradox of
blackness.
iii. Prisoners of Race
The final point is that the Kennedy/Bell debate makes clear how much we
are all still very much prisoners of this mythical construct called race, and in
particular, the black race. The notion that Kennedy is a "traitor to his race"
is wholly motivated by the implied prescription that Kennedy should be loyal
to his race. What is Kennedy's "race" and who made that decision? Was he
consulted in the matter? The proposition that Kennedy's race is a God-given,
"natural" attribute unfortunately reflects a profound ignorance about the
arbitrary, uninformed, unscientific nature of a decision made by one man more
than 200 years ago.286 We would do well to minimize the extent to which
we rely upon and perpetuate this vicious and dangerous idea called race.
b. Kennedy's Side of the Debate
i. General Alignment of Views
There is much in what Kennedy has said that is consistent with the analysis
outlined above and, more generally, with the ideas developed in this Article.
For example, the idea that all minority scholars must have unique perspectives
upon the law is flatly inconsistent with the idea of progress toward a non-
racist society.
284. This argument refutes the idea that the fight against racism is analogous to traditional warfare.
The moral nature of the battle requires those who fight to pay attention to the paradox. See supra text
accompanying notes 120-23.
285. Espinoza concludes her article by commenting: "Although there is much individual divergence,
focusing on the individual before we recapture that which is our shared difference would result in a
cacophony of voices unrecognized, indecipherable, and overwhelmed by the dominant discourse."
Espinoza, supra note 273, at 1886. It is clear that she is speaking of the paradox of deindividualization.
She proposes ignoring the individual and the paradox because to do otherwise would eliminate the
community (e.g., the culture of detrimental deindividualization). But the essence of the community is
the pain of deindividualization that its members commonly feel. The point is to eliminate deindividuali-
zation, even among the members-even though that which eliminates the pain necessarily entails
eliminating the community. The solution that I propose is to tolerate deindividualization among
minorities (using minority status to define groupness) while ameliorating it (by recognizing individuality,
encouraging non-minority membership in groups, and using traditional culture as a basis for grouping),
and while simultaneously using the group to fight the broader, more pernicious deindividualization. See
infra part IV.C.
286. The theory of non-race is discussed supra at note 110 and accompanying text.
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ii. Confronting the Paradox
An answer to the paradox of blackness is that we must, for a time, have it
both ways. We should aggressively pursue our goal of a non-racist society.
Instead of postponing or avoiding it, however, we should confront the paradox
for what it is, minimizing the extent to which we must be racists for the
purpose of fighting racism. As an illustration, a cultural analysis of some of
Kennedy's views that places minimal reliance on Kennedy's race and racial
allegiance follows.
As a threshold matter, some of the views espoused by Kennedy28 7 are the
views of one heavily influenced by the dominant cultural apparatus.288
Because that apparatus is controlled by individuals who have experienced
beneficial deindividualization (namely, white males) views consistent with
beneficial deindividualization are the views espoused by the cultural
apparatus. As an individual, Kennedy is free to espouse those views. If he
does, however, he should suffer of no delusion that he is bringing something
new to the table. On the other hand, if Kennedy wishes to write from the
perspective of those of us who have been detrimentally deindividualized, or
for that matter, if he wishes to balance his perspective, then he needs to get
"into the soup." He needs to recognize the incredible power of seeing the
same images and hearing the same arguments thousands of times from the
cultural apparatus. Then, he needs to open his mind to experience the
experience of those of us who have been detrimentally deindividualized.
What Kennedy finds may astound him. There are no qualified minority
applicants? I must again beg the reader's indulgence: Randy, I am one of a
handful of blacks in the United States who engage in law and economics.289
If degrees stand for anything in the qualification picture, I am, as far as I
know, one of two blacks at an American law school with a J.D. and a Ph.D.
in economics.29 Additionally, I hold five graduate degrees, three of them
professional degrees, with a sixth on the way.29" ' Yet upon inquiry (they did
not even have to go looking for me!), the country's better paying law schools
287. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 255, at 1762-63 (asserting that no qualified minority applicants exist).
288. The cultural apparatus and its domination are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 62-63.
289. Based on my personal knowledge, in addition to myself, Professors Benoit (NYU), Culp (Duke),
and Hylton (Northwestern) are black professors teaching law and economics at American law schools.
Relying on their self-identification in the 1993-94 American Association of Law Schools Directory as
minority professors, there are nine other minority scholars teaching law and economics at American law
schools. They are Professors Baquero (Puerto Rico), Hutchison (University of Detroit-Mercy), Lassiter
(Cincinnati), Robertson (Texas Southern), Haddock (Northwestern), Koch (William & Mary), Yen
(Boston College), Rodriguez (Bridgeport), and Wang (Hastings).
290. The other is Professor Hylton of Northwestern University.
291. Could this passage possibly be more self-serving?! For the second time, then, I must beg the
reader's indulgence. I feel compelled to use myself as an example, however, because of the significant
gap that exists between the pat, administrative "there are no qualified minorities" slogan, and the reality
of my experience. In the words of one of the commentators on a draft of this Article, I have no reason
to be apologetic, because "the facts are the facts." Accordingly, in wanton and malicious immodesty,
pursuant to the convention of law review authorship, my credentials are displayed at the beginning of
this Article for all to see.
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(including Harvard University) have not given me the time of day.29 2 Even
worse, I have watched as colleagues with lesser credentials, fewer publica-
tions, and less teaching experience land coveted jobs at some of these
institutions. That's right, you guessed it: they're white, I'm not. When I talk
to Derrick Bell about these matters, he has an explanation for me: Rac-
ism. 293 This I believe.294 "There are no qualified minorities?" Sure. Next
month's installment payment is absolutely, positively my last payment on the
Brooklyn Bridge I bought ten years ago.
Kennedy's blackness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
experiencing the detrimental deindividualization that is racism. If Kennedy
seeks to write from the perspective of those who have experienced racism, he
must exercise considerable effort to extricate himself from the mindset
produced by a lifetime of exposure to the dominant cultural apparatus. If,
however, Kennedy has personally experienced the kind of racism that many
scholars of color write about, then four possibilities remain.
The first possibility is that racism, or the subculture of detrimental
deindividualization, is not a strong subculture-it does not span many social
relationships-in Kennedy's life. The second possibility is that Kennedy has
experienced racism "in principle," but that experience has a different meaning
for him, primarily because racism has been embedded within other subcultures
(e.g., class). Kennedy, therefore, has not experienced the crass, naked racism
that is not embedded in other subcultures. If Kennedy wishes to write from
292. I assume that the institutions to which I applied knew that I was black since I checked off the
appropriate space in the AALS form I submitted with my resum6. Since there were a number of schools
that did not even bother to respond to my inquiry, I am led to conclude that the "we can'tfind qualified
minorities" argument is untrue.
Also, hopefully the reader will note that I have tried to avoid the debate over what does or does not
constitute a "prestigious" law school. I think all of my colleagues would agree, however, as to which
law schools have the highest faculty salaries, lowest teaching loads, most research support, etc.
293. Professor Bell (as is his exceptional nature) has given me some career advice over the past few
years. For a more formal statement of his position on minority hiring at American law schools, see
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in Still White Schools, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986). Bell took an unpaid leave of absence from Harvard Law School in 1990 to
protest the school's failure to grant tenure to any minority women on the faculty. In 1992, he was
dismissed from his position at the school for refusing to end his leave of absence. See Harvard Law
Notifies Bell of Dismissal for Absence, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A19. Harvard Law School has not
hired a minority woman for a tenure-track position on the law faculty to date. For more on the topic,
see Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who's Afraid of Derrick Bell? A Conversation on Harvard, Storytelling and
the Meaning of Color, 78 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 56 (interview with Professor Bell). Of course, by no
stretch of the imagination should this footnote or the statement in the body of the text be read to imply
that Professor Bell told me that I specifically was not considered at Harvard because of my race.
294. Pick a dimension, any dimension. Let us assume that the real way the world works is that one
accesses the elite schools through de minimis (but high) qualifications plus the old boy (or girl) network.
So why am I not part of the old boy network? I'm a pretty affable guy (no, really!). Answer: what it
means to be in a racist world is that social relationships are racially driven. Therefore, despite my best
efforts, the probability that I will be included is low. This is assuming that my otherwise comparable
credentials have not been devalued by my minority status. I should note that a major and recent
exception to this story of exclusion is represented by the efforts of Ken Dau-Schmidt, who has made
every effort to include me in the law.and economics old boy network (young: average age about 35).
For a discussion of the old boy network from the perspective of a minority law professor, see Charles
R. Lawrence III, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L.
REV. 429 (1986).
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the perspective of those who experience racism on a more frequent or potent
basis, my recommendation is the same as above: experience the perspective,
vicariously or otherwise.
The third possibility is that Kennedy has experienced racism with frequency
and potency, but refuses to characterize it as racism. I do not know Professor
Kennedy well enough to make this judgment. Even and especially if I did, I
would not render that judgment here. I am convinced, however, that there are
minorities in high places who exhibit a denial mixed with raw self-hatred that
is the focus of this third possibility. For me, this behavior is merely testament
to the power of the cultural apparatus to engage in both beneficial (e.g., there
is no racism by whites against blacks) and detrimental (e.g., blacks deserve
all the bad things they get) deindividualization.
The fourth possibility is that Kennedy has personally experienced racism,
but perhaps not with a high frequency or potency. Even if it has been with
high frequency or potency, however, the point is that he is convinced that the
method for combatting racism that is being pursued by critical race theorists
is not optimal. I would like to believe that it is this fourth possibility that
characterizes Kennedy's assessment of critical race theory. This fourth
possibility also goes to the heart of debates among minorities of different
ideological persuasions. 25 Because of its broader ramifications, it is this
possibility that I subject to economic analysis. Let me note, however, that I
am convinced that many of these debates over the optimal method are debates
over the frequency, potency, and denial of racism or acculturated self-hatred
that masquerade in the guise of debates over method.
C. Application: Economic Analysis of Cultural Analysis
of the Kennedy/Bell Debate
1. An Economic Model
There are many economic models one might employ to analyze the different
dimensions of the Kennedy/Bell debate. For example, one could argue that the
debate is really a lesson about the enormous cost of reshaping preferences
2 96
295. For example, focusing on blacks, there are a number of names that traditionally crop up in
discussing the black neo-conservative movement. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
RECONSIDERED: WAS IT NECESSARY IN ACADEMIA? (1975); THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION:
MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES (1972); Shelby Steele, I'm Black, You're White, Who's Innocent? Race and
Power in an Era of Blame, HARPER'S, June 1988, at 45. It is useful to note here that Sowell's most
recent book, Race and Culture, makes the case for the proposition that culture as well as face are
determinative of a group's success in society. THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE (1994). In view
of my discussion about my relative success and my experiences with racism, see, e.g., supra part II.E.I,
and given the fact that I am a black immigrant, the reader should not be surprised to discover that I
disagree with Sowell's thesis. I am of the belief that, in America at least, race, rather than culture, is
far more determinative of success. It is heartening to see, however, that more and more scholars are
beginning to discuss the difference between race and culture and the relative importance of those two
variables. It is a short step from that discussion to a discussion of the proposition that race is an artificial
and social construct.
296. For a discussion of the preference-shaping function of laws, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1.
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that have been shaped by myths so powerful that they are considered "natural"
(e.g., race). Kennedy and Bell, the story goes, have different assessments of
the enormity of those costs. As another example, production theory might be
invoked.297 Under that approach, Kennedy and Bell are implicit co-producers
who are using a production process whose ultimate output is the obliteration
of racism.29 Inefficient by-products-the intellectual and moral untidiness,
and the counterproductive dimension of using racism to fight racism-have
been tolerated for some time. The producers, however, now disagree as to the
efficiency of tolerating the by-products any further. 299
The preceding examples raise some interesting analytical and practical
possibilities. Nevertheless, because of the strategic nature of the behavior of
the parties in this context-Kennedy had the option of not publishing his
article, and the supporters of Bell had the option of not conducting a
colloquy-perhaps the most appropriate mode of economic analysis is game
theory. Game theory has been extant in the economics literature for at least
the past forty years.0 Only recently, however, have law and economics
scholars chosen to use it to analyze problems in the law.' The following
excursion is therefore quite consistent with the spirit of current law and
economics research.
At least four steps 302 are involved in conducting a game theoretic analysis
of a particular situation. One must (1) identify the players of the game;30 3
(2) identify the strategic options that the players face;3°4 (3) specify the
297. For good introductory discussions of the economics of production by the firm, see MICHAEL
L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN, MICROECONOMICS 251-74 (1991). For a more advanced discussion, see
RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1992).
298. For a discussion of the economics of production processes ("production functions"), see KATz
& ROSEN, supra note 297, at 257.
299. See id. at 640-57.
300. Game theory was originally introduced in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). For useful histories of game theory in
economics, see the articles cited infra note 301, and Andrew Schotter & Gerhard Schw6diauer,
Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 479 (1980).
301. One of the seminal pieces in this regard is Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1291 (1990) (reviewing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY (1989)). Since that time, the literature has blossomed considerably. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErLE DISPUTES (1991); Sergiu Hart, Shapley
Value, in THE NEW PALGRAVE:-GAME THEORY 210 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989); Kenneth W.
Abbott, "Trust but Verify". The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other
InternationalAgreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager,
The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Carol M. Rose,
Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 38 (1990). At least one American law school (NYU) offers an entire seminar on
game theory and the law.
302. "The basic structure of game theory consists of specifying the number of players in a game (or
the number of firms in an industry), the strategies available to each player, and the outcomes that accrue
to each player once a particular choice of strategies has been made." WALTER NICHOLSON,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 387 (4th ed. 1985). Game theory can be quite
mathematically complex. That complexity need not be entertained in this Article given the limited goals
that I wish to achieve with game theory. For this reason, I have elected to pursue the minimum number
of steps involved in game-theoretic analysis. For an example of the more complex steps involved, see
Ayres, supra note 301, at 1295-1300.
303. Ayres, supra note 301, at 1295-96.
304. Id.
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payoffs that results from pursuing particular strategic options;. 5 and
(4) "solve" the game, which usually involves predicting the particular strategic
option a party will choose." 6 Superimposed upon these four steps are the
various methods of classifying games. Perhaps the most popular method is to
classify according to the relationship among the payoffs. A zero-sum game
exists where the payoffs net to zero. That is, what player one wins is precisely
equivalent to what player two loses (e.g., conventional war, litigation). In a
nonzero-sum game, 0 7 the payoffs can sum to a negative number (i.e., a
negative sum game, like nuclear war) or to a positive number (i.e., a positive
sum game, like most forms of business competition).
Perhaps one of the most instructive and applicable forms of a nonzero-sum
game is the "prisoner's dilemma. 30 8 It will be useful to illustrate0 9 that
game and then generalize on the basis of the illustration. Following the steps
outlined above: the players in this game are you, the reader, and the other
people in the crowd at the next cocktail party that you attend. The strategic
options confronted by you and everyone else in the crowd are either to speak
softly or to shout. The players, and the strategic options confronted by the
players, can be arranged in a two-by-two matrix similar to Figure 2.
Other Attendee's Action
Speak Softly Shout
Speak
Softly
Individual's
Action
Shout
Figure 2
Four possible payoffs, corresponding to the four cells of the matrix, exist.
Cell 1 is possible because you have entered into an ironclad agreement with
the individuals in the crowd which requires that you will all speak softly.
They comply: they all speak softly. You comply: you speak softly. The payoff
is that you and the other individuals in the crowd can be heard clearly. Cell
4 is the opposite of Cell 1. Everyone breaches the agreement to speak softly.
Everyone else shouts. You shout. The payoff is that you and the other
individuals in the crowd can barely be heard. Cell 2 comes about because you
305. Id. at 1296.
306. Id.
307. See DONALD McCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 459-60 (1982).
308. For a good introduction to this game, see id. at 449-58.
309. For a discussion of the specific cocktail party illustration I use here, see id. at 454-55.
Cell 1 Cell 2
Individual is Individual
heard clearly, is drowned
out entirely.
Cell 3 Cell 4
Individual is Individual
heard very is barely
easily, heard.
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entered into the agreement to speak softly. The problem is that you comply
and the rest of the crowd does not. The payoff is that you are drowned out
entirely while the rest of the crowd can still hear one another to some extent.
Cell 3 is the reverse of Cell 2 in the sense that this time, you renege while the
crowd complies with the agreement. Since you are shouting while everyone
else is speaking softly, the payoff to you is that you will be heard very
easily.3 1
0
The solution to this game is known to the reader from experience. That is,
everyone at the cocktail party implicitly decides not to cooperate in the
implicit agreement to speak softly. Everyone pursues their individual self-
interest. The result is Cell 4, where each individual is barely heard.
It is now possible to generalize on the basis of this illustration. A prisoner's
dilemma game is a nonzero-sum game with the following payoffs under the
following circumstances. First, if the players cooperate, they will be led to the
best possible collective outcome-an outcome that is also acceptable at the
individual level-Cell 1. Second, if the players do not cooperate, they will be
led to the worst possible collective outcome-and one that is the worst at the
individual level as well-Cell 4. Third, an individual player can do best of all
by reneging on the cooperative agreement at the same time that the other
players abide by it-Cell 3.
At this level of generality, it may be useful to reflect on the nature of the
broader problem suggested by the prisoner's dilemma. The dilemma deals
with, and suggests, an ultimate outcome or solution to, the problem of
competition in an oligopoly.3 ' Collusion is too costly a solution when there
are many competitors,"' and it is unnecessary when there are no competi-
tors, as in a monopoly. Collusion will be worthwhile to a few competitors,
however, if the cost of enforcing the agreement to collude is reasonable
relative to the benefits of collusion. When the few competitors organize based
on an agreement, they are called a cartel. The incentive to organize is that
they can each do better within the cartel-Cell 1-than if they compete with
one another-Cell 4. The agreement must be enforced, however, since any
given member has a massive incentive to welsh-either to do better-Cell
3-or to avoid being the last one to welsh-Cell 2. A cartel that reverts to
competition is said to be unstable. 3 This is most likely to occur where the
cost of enforcing the agreement is simply too high. 4
An agreement that successfully survives does so mainly because it succeeds
in altering the payoffs that any given member faces (e.g., Cells 2 or 4).
Because the nature of the payoffs can vary greatly, so too can the nature of
310. See id. at 455.
311. Id. at 448-49.
312. At the limit, if there is an unlimited number of competitors ("perfect competition"), the cost of
cooperation will be exorbitant because the competitors must assemble, work out an agreement, and then
enforce it.
313. McCLosKEY, supra note 307, at 457; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27 (1984) (commenting on the instability of cartels).
314. See McCLOSKEY, supra note 307, at 457.
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the enforcement mechanisms (e.g., punishment, 1 5 shame, 316 etc.). The
prisoner's dilemma model is a model of enormous analytical power. It can be
used to shed light on everything from the behavior of the Federal Government
as a cartel of the member states317 to the behavior of players of tic-tac-
toe.3" The following section uses the model to shed some insight on the
Kennedy/Bell debate.
2. Application to the Kennedy/Bell Debate
Different dimensions of the Kennedy/Bell debate can be captured in
different games. In this section and that which follows, I discuss one such
game fully, and other possible games more briefly. The first game discussed
considers whether other minority scholars in the future will critique critical
race theory, and predicts that there will be some who will.
The state of the world for this game is the world before Kennedy published
his piece criticizing critical race theory. Therefore, the players in this game
are Kennedy and other minority scholars in critical race theory. A plausible
case can be made that Kennedy's'writings before his critical piece were in the
spirit of, or sympathetic to, the ideas posited by critical race theorists.31 9 It is
at the point of publishing his critical piece, therefore, that Kennedy and
critical race theorists unambiguously parted company. At that point, the
decision facing Kennedy was the same decision facing other minority scholars
within critical race theory. That is, each individual has the option to publish
or not publish views that are critical of critical race theory. Publishing is in
the self-interest of the publisher to the extent that it allows him to express his
own personal views. The matrix is captured in Figure 3.
Cell 1 represents the payoffs to Kennedy and those within critical race
theory when everyone abides by the implicit agreement that no minority
scholar will publish views critical of critical race theory. In this cell, the
immediate payoff is that the point of view of the group 320 is advanced by
Kennedy and by the members of the group. The longer term payoffs are the
psychic 32' and career benefits to everyone 322 from advancing this point of
view. The opposing cell is Cell 4, in which everyone, including Kennedy,
decides to be critical of critical race theory. The cost to the group is that its
315. Id. at 456.
316. Id. at 457.
317. Id. at 453.
318. Id. at 458.
319. In the Delgado & Stefancic critical race theory bibliography, cited supra at note 257, Kennedy
has two entries. One is his Harvard article critical of critical race theory. Kennedy, supra note 255. The
other is Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor
Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622 (1986), which discusses the oppressive racial order perpetuated by
the Supreme Court and the role of "celebrants" in that perpetuation.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 260-61.
321. Examples include the sense of belonging to a community of scholars, of acting morally, and
so forth.
322. To the extent that the scholars involved are publishing something distinctive, there are indeed
career benefits to be obtained.
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Refrain
from
Criticizing
Individual
Scholar's
Action
Criticize
Figure 3
Action of Other CRT Scholars
Refrain from
Criticizing Criticize
Cell 1 Cell 2
Both voices Individual's
are advanced, voice is
repressed.
Cell 3 Cell 4
Individual's Both voices
voice is much are repressed.
advanced.
point of view is lost in the babel, 323 if indeed the group exists at all.
Similarly, Kennedy's point of view swims in a sea of points of view from
other minority scholars critical of critical race theory. It is barely distinguish-
able.
In Cell 2, Kennedy has entered into an implicit agreement with other
minority scholars not to publish views critical of critical race theory. Kennedy
abides by this agreement and continues to publish pieces sympathetic to
critical race theory. This point of view is scarcely noticed, since everyone else
has reneged on the implicit agreement and is publishing works critical of the
critical race point of view. Finally, in Cell 3, it is Kennedy who reneges on
the implicit agreement that minority scholars not publish views critical of
critical race theory. His personal point of view stands out since everyone else
is publishing works that are supportive of critical race theory. Cell 3 clearly
has come to pass, with Kennedy choosing to renege.
There are several reasons, however, why one might suggest that the ultimate
equilibrium of the intellectual cartel of critical race theory will be Cell 4.
First, cartels encourage their members to select Cell 1 (cooperation) and not
Cell 4 (reneging), by taking measures that alter the payoff in Cell 4. For
example, the group might punish members who renege, or have effective
methods of apprehending those who renege. Both methods would cause
individual members to revise their expected payoff in Cell 4. In this regard,
it could be argued that critical race theorists did not fare well. Not only did
the group not succeed in punishing Kennedy for publishing his personal
critical views, it may have inadvertently rewarded him (e.g., the publicity of
the colloquy,3"4 etc.). Assuming that all other things are constant, new and
old members of the group have now revised their payoff estimates upward and
323. Perhaps this is the "cacophony of voices" referred to by Espinoza. See Espinoza, supra note
273, at 1886.
324. The colloquy was a collection of articles in response to Randall Kennedy's critical article. See
supra note 264. It included articles by Ball, supra note 271, Barnes, supra note 272, Brewer, supra note
264, Delgado, supra note 268, and Espinoza, supra note 273.
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not downward, and are therefore more likely to renege on the implicit
agreement that minority scholars not criticize critical race theory.
A second reason why Cell 4 might be the equilibrium or ultimate outcome
for critical race theory is that, given the preceding cultural analysis, the
incentive for any individual minority scholar to "cheat" may be just too great.
True, minorities collectively face the problem of racism. But one powerful
reason why racism is a problem for each of us is that it robs us of our
uniqueness and individuality through the guise of the myth of race. Paradoxi-
cally, one possible response is to assert one's individuality to the detriment
of the collective. I have argued in this Article that although a response to the
paradox is warranted, this method is not the optimal response.325 Other
minority scholars may not be persuaded by my argument.
Finally, Cell 4 may be the ultimate outcome of the critical race theory cartel
simply because of the difficulty of identifying the termination point of the
cartel. That is, a natural resources cartel terminates once the natural resource
has been fully depleted by the cartel members.326 One might be tempted to
argue that once racism is vanquished, there will be no need for critical race
theory. However, unlike the natural resources depletion situation, there are
counter-currents in the case of racism. Racism serves as a means to delineate
cultural boundaries.327 Some, especially if they see blackness and African-
Americanism as inextricably intertwined,328 may argue for the continued
existence of racism as a means to preserve culture. As critical race theory
becomes more successful and racism is abated, the termination of the cartel
will not be as swift as might be expected. Instead, as the loosely organized
cartel persists, one would expect to see a diversity of minority scholars
offering a diversity of viewpoints, many of them critical of critical race
theory.
The reasons suggested above may either not materialize or be corrected by
critical race theorists, leading to a long existence in Cell 1 of the matrix
shown in Figure 3. The social equivalent of the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle-that measurement effort may cause movement, leading to ultimate
unmeasurability3 29-may also come into play. Critical race theorists who
read this Article may be motivated to make changes to ensure that my
predictions will not come to pass. Such changes will allow critical race theory
to continue to make valuable contributions to legal thought.
325. See my proposal of the proper response to the paradox in light of Kennedy's piece, supra at
note 285.
326. There are other reasons a cartel such as OPEC might terminate, including its fundamental
instability (e.g., inability to prevent cheating by members). For more advanced discussions of the
stability of cartels, see Easterbrook, supra note 313.
327. For a discussion of the relationship between race and ethnicity, see supra text accompanying
notes 90-100.
328. I have argued that the two are separable. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
329. DAVID C. CASSIDY, UNCERTAINTY: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF WERNER HEISENBERG 226-46
(1991); see also ERNST CASSIRER, DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM IN MODERN PHYSICS (1956)
(discussing various philosophical, physical, and metaphysical aspects of determinism and indeterminism);
ALEXANDRE KoYR, NEWTONIAN STUDIES 5 (1965) (noting that the issue of indeterminacy is a very
powerful controversy).
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At a minimum, the value of the preceding exercise has been to demonstrate
how economic analysis can inform a legal or law-related problem that is
situated within another culture or subculture. There remain other dimensions
of the Kennedy/Bell debate that are amenable to game-theoretic analysis. For
example, a possible game being played by those on each side of the
Kennedy/Bell debate centers on whether to take a racist or non-racist posture
in the fight against racism. As another example, a series of games arise when
one characterizes the Kennedy/Bell debate as a disagreement over the question
of who are the correct players in the game of racism (e.g., game 1: us or
them, game 2: us or them or society, game 3: us or society). Unfortunately,
because of space limitations, those remain games for another day.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIPS OF CCL&Ec
The purpose of this final Part is to show how CCL&Ec is related to certain
other currents in the law. Subpart A discusses how the two branches of
CCL&Ec are related to one another. Subpart B explores how CCL&Ec is
related to certain discrete jurisprudential movements in the law. Finally,
Subpart C discusses the practical implementation of CCL&Ec, couched within
a discussion of the amorphous and very recent movement of pragmatism in
jurisprudential thought.
A. The Relationship of CCL&Ec-C to CCL&Ec-L
In the case of CCL&Ec-C, it is culture that informs law and economics
analysis-for example, the law and economics of discrimination analyzed
from another cultural perspective. In CCL&Ec-L, it is law and economics
analysis that informs culture-for example, using the game theory to analyze
the Kennedy/Bell debate in critical race theory. These two branches of
CCL&Ec-CCL&Ec-C and CCL&Ec-L-are reflected on the right- and left-
hand sides respectively, of Figure 4.
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Neutrls-iased' IBiased (Face, Use)I~oo~I Economic[ "-' Economic
Ineral nea
Cultural Cultural
Figure 4
Figure 4 makes it clear how the two branches of CCL&Ec are related to one
another. In the case of CCL&Ec-C, the discussion of the legal dimensions of
an internal cultural problem from a different cultural perspective demonstrates
the biased nature of economic tools or analyses. The economic tools or
analyses may be biased on their face or in their application. To be sure, there
are many consequences of pointing out the biased nature of the economic
tools or economic analyses. One consequence is that these now less-biased
tools or analyses will be available for use in dealing with some other internal
cultural problem.33' This connection is reflected in the arrow pointing from
the right- to the left-hand side of Figure 4. Note that CCL&Ec-L, the left-
hand side of Figure 4, also involves bringing neutral economic tools or
analyses to bear upon the legal dimensions of internal cultural problems.
Figure 4 demonstrates that CCL&Ec does not exist to supplant or otherwise
occupy the space that law and economics fills. Clearly, problems exist that are
cross-cultural in nature (e.g., providing minimum health care for a popula-
tion). Law and economics continues to have vitality in providing the broad
intellectual structures within which the economic analysis of law will be
conducted. In the limited instances where law and economic scholars are
crossing boundaries into cultures not fully their own, however, it is conceiv-
able that CCL&Ec will enjoy some applicability.
B. The Relationship Between CCL&Ec & Other Movements
1. CCL&Ec & Critical Race Theory
By this point, it should be clear that there are significant areas of overlap
between CCL&Ec and critical race theory. For example, both frameworks
330. There is no reason why the legal dimensions of the internal cultural problems on the left- and
right-hand side of Figure 4 should necessarily be different problems. It is unlikely, however, that they
will be the same problem.
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place emphasis on the points of view of legal scholars of color.33' Indeed,
at least one example can be found of a critical race theory scholar who
conducts a law and economic analysis of a law-related problem from her
cultural point of view.332 CCL&Ec emphasizes that individuals other than
scholars of color are capable of learning and appreciating perspectives often
attributed to scholars of color. It remains unclear whether critical race theory
subscribes to the latter view.3 33 Both frameworks emphasize the importance
of telling stories-immersion into the database of life experience-as an
analytical method.334
At least two important differences are worth noting. First, there is much in
a name. In this Article, I have made much of my radical theory of non-race-
the proposition that the mythical construct of race is itself racist since its very
existence makes inevitable the association of psychological characteristics
with physically apparent and immutable ones.335 It is possible, and even
desirable from my point of view, to discuss the experience of deindivi-
dualization while not reinforcing the idea of race, which is one reason why
the word "culture" and not "race" is the word employed to characterize the
framework proposed in this Article. Another reason is that culture spans
experiences that have nothing to do with "race" (e.g., gender). By highlighting
this difference between the two frameworks, readers should not interpret my
comments as denigrating the considerable successes of critical race theory.
A second major difference between the two frameworks is the role that
cultural analysis and law and economics play in CCL&Ec. One of the
objectives of this Article is to provide a framework that expands the power
of law and economic analysis. It is in this sense that the methodology and
substantive emphases of critical race theory are far broader than those of
CCL&Ec.
2. CCL&Ec & Critical Legal Studies
Critical legal studies can be characterized as a movement which involves
directing certain critiques (e.g., "Indeterminacy," "entrenchment," etc.) at
certain legal objects (e.g., legal rules, the legal academy, etc.).336 From the
standpoint of methodology, methodological eclecticism appears to be the order
of the day in critical legal studies.337 If these characterizations are correct,
331. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 257. In assessing the themes of critical race theory,
Delgado and Stefancic state: "Many Critical Race theorists consider that a principal obstacle to racial
reform is majoritarian mindset." Id. at 462. Also, although not all scholars of color have experienced
discrimination, several have and can therefore write from this perspective.
332. See Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison, 101 YALE L.J.
1631 (1992) (conducting a costlbenefit analysis of affirmative action and concluding that the benefits
outweigh the costs).
333. See supra text accompanying note 261.
334. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 257, at 462. For a discussion of the methodology of
cultural anthropology, see supra notes 141-56 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
336. Audain, supra note 1, at 1034-35.
337. Id. at 1037.
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then it is conceivable that there might be some common ground between
CCL&Ec and critical legal studies. For example, both frameworks critique the
veneer of objectivity of law and economic analysis. 331
There are, however, some important differences between the two frame-
works. First, a critical legal studies scholar might seek to show not only that
there is a veneer of objectivity to law and economic analysis, but that the
veneer conceals power differences, perpetuates the interests of the powerful,
and so on.3 39 At times, the critical legal studies analysis will prove to be
correct, and therefore such analysis has its place. The objective of CCL&Ec
is not as ambitious. CCL&Ec would show the limits of objectivity to the
extent that a different cultural perspective would lead to a different analytical
outcome.
340
Second, there are strains in critical legal studies that hold that all of law
and economic analysis lacks objectivity. Indeed, these strains can be and have
been characterized as being antipositivistic. 341 Once again I emphasize my
belief that these strains have a valuable role to play in the legal academy.342
Note, however, that these antipositivistic strains of critical legal studies part
company with CCL&Ec to the extent that CCL&Ec holds that the difficulty
is not with all of law and economics. CCL&Ec maintains that the analytical
difficulty arises especially when an analyst crosses cultural boundaries or is
unaware of the cultural bias of the economic tool or analysis being utilized.
The objective of CCL&Ec is to temper or be tempered by positivism, not to
eliminate it. Stated differently, the "Critical" in CCL&Ec is a reference to the
word "critical" as used by Kant, the father of critical theory, to expose the
structures and capacities of reason.343 It is not the meaning of the word
338. In my CCL&Ec critique of the law and economics of discrimination, for example, I make much
of the argument that the cultural perspective of Posner and Epstein biases the law and economic analysis
that they conduct. See supra text accompanying part II.E. Along similar lines, critical legal studies
scholars have criticized law and economics. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987) (restating the critical legal studies critique of law and economics, focusing on the fallacy and
emptiness of right-wing libertarian theory); Mark M. Hager, The Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient:
Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 7 (1991); see also Mark Hager, Against Liberal
Ideology, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1051 (1988) (reviewing KELMAN, supra).
339. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 338.
340. Of course, one could incorporate power into the analysis by showing that a given cultural
perspective serves to perpetuate the holding of power by a certain group.
341. See Standen, supra note 130, at 983.
342. Throughout a previous article, I note that there can be full reciprocal dialogue between and
among the various jurisprudential movements (i.e., critical legal studies, law and economics, feminist
jurisprudence, and mainstream thought) if and only if the various movements maintain their structural
integrity. Audain, supra note 1, at 1019 n.3, 1058. I am a champion of the usefulness and continued
existence of critical legal studies. Stated differently, it is very consistent with the positivistic idea of
fallibilism to suggest that the existence of critical legal studies is necessary to point out the fallacies of
positivism. For a definition of fallibilism, see supra note 130.
343. For a discussion of Kant's work, A Critique of Pure Reason, in establishing a critical theory,
see MELCHERT, supra note 130, at 367-70. Indeed, a strong case can be made for the proposition that
what I am attempting to do with CCL&Ec is very consistent with some dimensions of the neo-Kantian
movement that prevailed in Germany from 1870 to 1920. This movement laid the foundation for the
modem versions of sociology and the anthropological theories discussed supra at note 16. Compare for
example, my critique of the law and economics of discrimination with the proposition that "[k]nowledge
of history and of culture, of what [Wilhelm] Dilthey [one of the central actors in the movement] referred
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"critical" as subsequently reformulated by the Frankfurt school, and adopted
by critical legal studies, that fact and value are always inseparable. 44
A final difference is that CCL&Ec uses law and economics and cultural
analysis as its analytical backdrop. The mission of critical legal studies
appears to be that of providing a perpetual critique.345 Few critical legal
studies scholars have spent time dealing with the question of what it is that
will replace the legal objects eritiqued by critical legal studies.346 This issue
does not arise in CCL&Ec, since it does not seek to replace cultural and law
and economics analysis.
3. CCL&Ec & Feminist Jurisprudence
Feminist jurisprudence has been defined as "'an examination of the rela-
tionship between law and society from the point of view of all women.' 347
Hopefully, CCL&Ec will create a space within which the practitioners of
feminist jurisprudence can critique certain aspects of law and economics. For
example, it could be argued that some aspects of family law reinforce
detrimental deindividualization (e.g., oppression) of women through, among
other things, the lax enforcement of child support judgments. It is therefore
conceivable that the economic analysis of family law 341 might also
implicitly reinforce this oppression. This could be uncovered through a
critique of law and economics based on feminist jurisprudence.
Of course, it is also conceivable that law and economics might serve to
inform some aspects of feminist jurisprudence. For example, the paradox of
deindividualization may be something that manifests itself in feminist
thought.349 If this is true, then the economic analysis of critical race
theory35 may yield insights for feminist jurisprudence as well.
to as the 'objectifications' of the human mind, could be derived, he argued, through some form of
internal process-through lived experience and through understanding." MORRIS, supra note 130, at 149.
See generally id. at 143-52, for a discussion of neo-Kantian perspectives.
344. See Standen, supra note 130, at 994.
345. See Audain, supra note I, at nn.57-58.
346. One possible reason for this is that critical legal studies, like the Frankfurt school of critical
theory it represents, has been "rendered speechless by their own philosophy." Standen, supra note 130,
at 994. It should be noted, however, that division in the ranks of critical legal studies turns on the twin
questions: (1) whether critical legal studies should be offering a replacement for that which it critiques,
and (2) what should be the nature of that replacement. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements
of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 620 nn.99, 101, 103 (1989).
347. Christine A. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 1, 3
(1987) (quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Panel Discussion on Developing Feminist Jurisprudence, at
the 14th National Conference on Women and Law, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1983)).
348. For a good summary of the current state of this body of work, see POSNER, supra note I, at
139-61.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
350. See supra part III.C.2.
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4. CCL&Ec & Non-Chicago Law & Economics
I would be remiss if I were to leave the reader with the impression that law
and economics, as it is applied today, is without its nascent internal critiques
or variants. For example, some members of the "reformist" 351 or "Post-
Chicago ' 352 school of law and economics seek to challenge the conservative
ideological hegemony of the free market analysis espoused by the Chicago
school of law and economics (or the Virginia school of public choice
economics, 35 3 its close cousin).35 4 As another example, the nascent institu-
tionalist school of law and economics reflects the influence of institutionalism
in economics.355 Institutionalism, which stresses the functional importance
of institutions (e.g., marriage) to a culture, is a movement in anthropology
that had its beginnings in the early part of this century.356 Perhaps its most
vocal proponent in economics was Thorstein Veblen.357 The tradition of
Institutionalism is one that became based in, and continues to this day at, the
University of Wisconsin Economics Department.358
There are important differences and similarities here. Consider first the
nascent internal critiques of law and economics. An significant difference is
that these important critiques are first and foremost ideological critiques. The
dictionary definition of ideology is "the ideas or manner of thinking
characteristic of an individual or group. 359 Yet, if culture is concerned with
the meaning of ideas, it is clear that culture subsumes ideology. Stated
differently, CCL&Ec has no particular ideological agenda in the traditional
sense (e.g., conservative or liberal). It does, however, have an ideological
agenda in being committed to the idea that culture, at times, does matter to
law and economic analysis.
351. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law & Economics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW
AND ECONOMICS 233, 244-47 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
352. See Symposium, Post-Chicago Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1989);
Symposium, Non-Posnerian Law and Economics, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 197 (1989).
353. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989); THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-Il (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory
of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988); Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1991).
354. The argument here is that the Chicago and Virginia schools are, in effect, different sides of the
same ideological coin. The Chicago school celebrates free markets, while the Virginia school
demonstrates the inability of government to effectively represent public choice.
355. See Nicholas Mercuro, Toward a Comparative Institutional Approach to the Study of Law and
Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 351, at 1.
356. Institutionalism is essentially functionalism, discussed supra at note 18.
357. See DAVID SECKLER, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND THE INSTITUTIONALISTS: A STUDY IN THE
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (1975); THORSTEIN VEBLEN: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL (Douglas
F. Dowd ed., 1958); Jeff E. Biddle & Warren J. Samuels, Thorstein Veblen on War, Peace, and National
Security, in ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A HISTORY OF THEIR INTERACTION 87 (Crawford
D. Goodwin ed., 1991).
358. See generally AN INSTITUTIONALIST GUIDE TO ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (Marc R. Tool
ed., 1984); WILLIAM M. DUGGER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONALIST
DISSENT (1992) (discussing institutionalism and its relation to neoclassical economics); SECKLER, supra
note 357.
359. FUNK & WAGNALL, STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 665 (1977).
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An example will suffice. One of the foundations of Burkean (conservative)
ideology is that ideas that have withstood the test of time are more trust-
worthy than ideas of more recent origin.36 It is conceivable that I might
agree with this proposition as exemplified in several domains (e.g., govern-
ment monetary and fiscal conservatism).36' Yet, my membership in the
culture of detrimental deindividualization causes me to flatly reject the
validity of Burkean ideology when it is applied to the racial status quo of a
cultural apparatus that is very often antagonistic to people and things non-
white. My cultural experience has influenced what the idea of conservatism
means to me. That experience would motivate me to critique some parts of
(conservative) law and economic analysis while accepting others.
Another important difference between CCL&Ec and the internal critiques
of law and economics is that the second branch of CCL&Ec, CCL&Ec-L, is
in effect a reverse critique of the Chicago school of law and economics. As
a critique of culture through the tools of law and economics, it seeks to
expand the possibilities for application of the traditional Chicago school of
law and economics. This second branch is not present in internal critiques of
law and economics.
Of course, there are similarities between CCL&Ec and the current internal
critiques of law and economics. As a general matter, those ideological
critiques that may be driven by or reflect a different cultural perspective are
completely consistent with CCL&Ec.
362
Consider also the nascent institutional law and economics. Both CCL&Ec
and the institutional school conduct a cultural critique of law and economics.
An important difference is that the institutional school seems to be committed
to one of many possible theories of culture (i.e., functionalism), while
CCL&Ec is amenable to all manner of cultural analyses.36 3 Also, the second
branch of CCL&Ec discussed above-CCL&Ec-L-is not present in the
institutional school.
360. See CHARLES W. DUNN & J. DAVID WOODARD, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM FROM BURKE TO
BUSH: AN INTRODUCTION (1991); PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE: THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND
REVOLUTION (1991).
361. The idea that government need not balance its budget but could "deficit spend" was, in the
history of economic thought, a very radical idea (that has obviously caught on!). This radical idea was
partly the basis for an intellectual revolution in economic thought in the early part of this century that
has been termed the "Keynesian Revolution," after John Maynard Keynes, the economist responsible
for the radical idea. For a discussion of the Keynesian revolution, see generallyBRIAN J. MCCORMICK,
HAYEK AND THE KEYNESIAN AVALANCHE (1992). But see generally DISSENT ON KEYNES: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (Mark Skousen ed., 1992).
362. Unfortunately, it is too early, and the internal critiques of law and economics are too few, to
identify the cultures that motivate internal critiques. It is possible, however, to note that much of the
reform critique of law and economics is consistent with some aspects of CCL&Ec. For example, the
CCL&Ec posture that I have taken-that the market will not cure discrimination-is consistent with a
general reform critique of the Chicago school's posture that the market can solve almost anything. See
supra part II.E.
363. The various possible theories of culture are discussed supra at note 18.
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C. The Relationship of CCL&Ec to Pragmatism & Postmodernism
Although it is not easily subject to definition, postmodemism is represented
primarily by a diminished reliance upon grand narratives (e.g., "the march of
progress").364 Postmodernism has made its presence felt in several intellec-
tual disciplines, including law.3 65 I am convinced that the current influence
of Pragmatism, 3 66 at least in law,367 is in part a consequence of post-
modernity. That is, with the death of the grand stories about what should
work, we are left with mainly one grand story: We will use what does
work-for now.
3 68
When one considers the broader agenda of proposing a framework for
CCL&Ec, 369 it becomes obvious that the intellectual confluence of that
agenda with postmodernism is ambiguous. That is, CCL&Ec seeks to debunk
the grand story that law and economic analysis is devoid of cultural influence
at all times. 37 It leaves intact, however, the grand story that law and
economic analysis reflects foundational aspects of human nature that will be
true across cultures and across time-for example, by and large, individuals
take actions that are in their self-interest.
CCL&Ec's confluence with pragmatism is unambiguous, however. Indeed,
CCL&Ec's ambiguity with respect to postmodernism is the price that it must
pay for its unambiguous commitment to pragmatism. It seems eminently
pragmatic to suggest that we should always and everywhere seek out balance
in human endeavors. Indeed, our inclination as a species to vacillate between
364. "In American culture, grand narratives seem to have faltered more noticeably than elsewhere,
not least as a result of the apocalyptic events of the 1930s." DOUGLAS TALLACK, TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA: THE INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 325 (1991). See generally MODERNIST
ANTHROPOLOGY (Marc Manganaro ed., 1990) (examining views on the influence of modernism and
postmodernism on the methods and views of anthropology); THEORIES OF MODERNITY AND
POSTMODERNITY (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1990) (examining the past and future impact of modernity and
postmodernity, in general).
365. See J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1966 (1992);
Anthony E. Cook, Reflections on Postmodernism, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 751 (1992); Dennis Patterson,
Postmodernism/FeminismLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992). For observations on some problems
inherent in Balkin's definitional approach, see Francis J. Mootz III, Postmodern Constitutionalism as
Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 515 (1992).
366. Pragmatism is a uniquely American philosophy developed in the early part of this century by
Charles Pierce, John Dewey, and William James. The very simple tenet of this philosophical school of
thought is that philosophers should not be concerned with "meaningless gibberish," MELCHERT, supra
note 130, at 473, but rather with philosophy and morality that work. See generally id. at 461-87.
There has been a renewal of pragmatism in other disciplines. See generally ERNEST E. BAYLES,
PRAGMATISM IN EDUCATION (1966); EMILE DURKHEIM, PRAGMATISM AND SOCIOLOGY (John B. Allcock
ed. & J.C. Whitehouse trans., 1983); PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991).
367. This is a very recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990).
368. One scholar who seems to agree with this conclusion is the philosopher, Richard Rorty. See
TALLACK, supra note 364, at 326.
369. See the discussion of the embedded agendas of this Article supra at text following note 15.
370. This assumption reflects the influence of the classical logical positivist model discussed above.
See supra note 130. Also, note that acceptance of the entire model is inconsistent with a realist
philosophy of the social sciences.
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states of imbalance,37 ' as opposed to pursuing a perpetual state of balance,
is fascinating. So it is that postmodernism in its most extreme variant seems
to be imbalanced. Although it is a blessed insight of postmodernism that not
all grand stories are worth keeping, we need not debunk all grand stories-
some are actually worth keeping.372 The trick now is to separate the wheat
from the chaff; CCL&Ec represents one attempt to accomplish this task.
Another one of this Article's agendas, advancing the cause of non-racism,
is unambiguously confluent with postmodernism and pragmatism. In the spirit
of postmodernity, this Article has advanced a radical theory of non-race. 73
This theory is an attempt to debunk not just the myth or grand story of the
"natural" existence of different races, but also the grand story that race is
possible. This position is staked out not just in the interests of truth, but also
as a pragmatic idea. As long as we conceive of the possibility of race, that it
is natural and proper to segment humans according to their apparent and
immutable physical characteristics, then racism will remain with us. As long
as we believe race is possible, there will continually be a new racial
segmentation to replace some older one. Bell's notion of racial realism-
racism will always be with us374 -is valid only if one accepts his implicit
assumption about the naturalness of race and our inability to free ourselves
from the shackles of this construct.
In the immortal words of the great pragmatist, Jerome Culp: "How do we
get there from here? '375 Throughout this Article, ways in which we might
advance toward a non-racist society have been suggested. They are summa-
rized here.
First, we can get there from here through open and frequent society-wide
dialogue about the difference between traditional culture, race, and the culture
of deindividualization. That these three constructs should be used inter-
changeably by many in our society suggests that the distinctions among them
are unclear. For example, what it means to be black in America is that the
likelihood is high that one has experienced racism. That is it. Since that
experience is a statistical event, there are blacks in America who have not
experienced racism with frequency or intensity-they are not members of the
culture of detrimental deindividualization. What it means to be African-
371. I offer here no improvement on Hegel's notion of the dialectic. Hegelians (not Hegel) have used
the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis to refer to this vacillation of imbalance. See MELCHERT, supra
note 130, at 404, 408.
372. See Barry Smart, Modernity, Postmodernity and the Present, in THEORIES OF MODERNITY AND
POSTMODERNITY, supra note 364, at 14.
373. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
374. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363 (1992). For responses by several
commentators agreeing with some of Bell's premises but challenging his pessimism, see Willie Abrams,
A Reply to Derrick Bell's Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 517 (1992); Richard Delgado, Derrick
Bell's Racial Realism: A Comment on White Optimism and Black Despair, 24 CONN. L. REv. 527
(1992); Linda S. Greene, Civil Rights at the Millennium: A Response to Bell's Callfor Racial Realism,
24 CONN. L. REv. 499 (1992); and john a. powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L.
REV. 533 (1992).
375. This was Culp's comment to me following the presentation of this paper at the May, 1993, Law
and Society Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois.
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American is that one is a member and partakes of some or all of the
traditional indicia (e.g., song, language) of a traditional subculture. The twist
here is that experiences within the culture of detrimental deindividualization
(i.e., racism) have formed the basis for some but not all of the indicia of
African-American culture. Clearly, one need not be black or have experienced
racism to be a member of African-American culture. 6
This dialogue might occur as a discussion about the way the law conflates
traditional culture, race, and the culture of deindividualization. That is
conceivably a subject for another article or possibly even a book. Suffice it
to say that legal opinions377 and statutes 378 consistently conflate these
three constructs. I would assume that the conflation in that domain reinforces
the conflation in the minds of many.
Second, we at various levels of our society (e.g., in the classroom or the
boardroom) need to imagine often the immense practicality of a world without
race. 379 One way to achieve this is to conduct the experiment of thinking
376. More clearly, the distinction is that ethnicity is largely based on cultural rather than strictly
racial differences between groups-conceptions of "race" stem from perceived differences in appearance
that are often culturally derived. JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 9 (1978), cited in
BRIAN J. GODFREY, NEIGHBORHOODS IN TRANSITION 31 (1988).
377. See, e.g., Westfield v. Illinois Dep't of Labor, No. 90-3335, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5777, at
*6 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 1992) ("While there was some underutilization of blacks downstate, only one
minority office manager in the central region (not African-American), and only two black office
managers of 36 downstate, defendant urged that the concentration of African-American office managers
meant that technically it could not be said that there were no or few minority group members in the
classification .... ") (emphases added); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he Government excluded potential jurors who, like Defendant, are African-American ('black').")
(emphases added); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (Hatchett, J.,
concurring) (noting that the prosecution must articulate "a neutral explanation for challenging Afro-
American (black) jurors") (emphases added); Hobbs v. Pennell, 754 F. Supp. 1040, 1042 (D. Del. 1991)
("Among the Nation of Islam's tenets are the belief that a separate nation must be created for
African-Americans, because blacks and whites cannot co-exist. . . .") (emphases added); Murray v.
National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing the testimony of an
expert witness who had studied "'the portrayal and treatment of Afro-Americans (or BlackAmericans).'")
(emphases added) (quoting the plaintiff's affidavit), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
378. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5703 (1988) (establishing "National Afro-American (Black) History
Month"); 1991 IOWA ACTS § 7 (substituting "African-Americans" for "blacks" in IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 216A.1 (West 1993)); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 29 1 (d) (McKinney 1993) (stating that "[S]tatistical
information shall contain, but not be limited to, the following ethnic categories: (i) Caucasian; (ii) Asian;
(iii) American Indian; (iv) Afro-American/Black") (emphasis added).
379. As one example, consider the remarkable efficiency gains that would result if the police
received an actual literal description of a "black" suspect. Because the suspect might be a male with
literally black skin, hazel eyes, and tightly curled brown hair, the police would not have to stop me and
nine other "black" males on the street. This would save 10 people from the remarkably unpleasant
experience (trust me, it is unpleasant) of being a suspect in a crime, or worse, being incarcerated in a
case of "mistaken identity." Because the police would not have to stop 10 people wrongly while the
suspect escaped, the probability that they would apprehend the real suspect would increase enormously.
This state of the world would come about once we learned to look at individuals as such, with different
skin tones, eye colors, temperaments, etc., and not just as "black" or "white" or "yellow." For a
discussion of the evidence that misidentification increases-sharply when the perpetrator is a person of
color and the victim or witness is not, see Sheri L. Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in
Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984). For arguments against the proposition that the race
of the assailant should be a consideration in evaluating self-defense claims, see Jody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 781 (1994).
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about how an alien visiting our planet would view our racial situation. The
alien would try very hard, but would fail to understand why we were so
adamant about the naturalness and necessity of using skin color (i.e., and not
earlobe size) as the basis of categorizing ourselves. The alien would think it
silly. Given the arbitrariness and unreliability of any system of categorization,
not to mention the remarkable malleability of human nature, the alien would
then wonder about this obsession we have with physically categorizing
ourselves. The alien would be especially perplexed about this obsession once
it discovered the net destructive effect that this categorization has on the well-
being of our species. One level at which this thought experiment might be
conducted is in the law school classroom, particularly in courses that deal
with matters of race and culture.
Third, participants in race-based organizations should admit to the paradox
we confront and make every effort to ameliorate it. It is impractical to suggest
that we jettison these organizations or their important missions while racism
still thrives. There are things that we can do, such as including and indeed
soliciting the presence within our membership of those who do not look like
us. We can also stop treating one another with the presumption that we all
are, or should be, alike.380
Finally, at the most personal level, we can all start approaching one another
as individuals, actively seeking out the quirks that make us each unique and
the commonalities that make us all similar. One way to accomplish this is to
approach each individual with a sense of wonderment, a sense of probable
culture (as most of us approach a small child who is alone), always holding
open the possibility that our expected culture will not be the individual's
actual culture. I see no difficulty with treating the individual as a member of
a given culture once the individual has identified himself or herself as such.
The key, I suppose, is in accepting individuals for whom they have chosen to
be culturally, as opposed to accepting them for choosing the culture we think
they should have chosen or rejecting them because they have not chosen the
culture we think they should have chosen. The latter is deindividualization,
pure and simple.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have defined critical cultural law and economics to be the
manner in which law and economics informs, and is informed by, culture. In
one branch of CCL&Ec, it is culture that informs law and economics. In
another branch, it is law and economics that informs culture. The explication
of the dimensions of CCL&Ec has necessitated an intellectual detour into the
nature of culture. Along this detour, a culture of deindividualization was
380. For a sample of some of the difficulties within the African-American community in this regard,
see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Judy Scales-Trent,
Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305
(1990).
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defined as the attribution of psychological characteristics on the basis of
apparent and immutable physical characteristics, which, as an act we all
participate in, rises to the level of a culture with all the concomitant
ramifications. In this Article, I have also defined a radical theory of non-race,
which states that not only racial divisions but the very idea of race itself is
racist since the idea makes racial classification, and therefore psychological
attribution, inevitable. This creates a paradox because those of us who have
been classified as racial minorities must often rely on that classification to
resist those who would so classify us.
Analyzing the law and economics of discrimination using the methodology
of cultural anthropology shows that there are propositions within the former
that are problematic from the perspective of one who has experienced
discrimination. This is an example of culture informing law and economics.
Using cultural analysis and the economics of game theory, predictions about
the impact of Randall Kennedy's work on the future of critical race theory
became possible.
Hope, of course, springs deliriously eternal. It does so especially because
of our incredible capacity as a species to throw caution to what seems
teleological and to reinvent ourselves with each generation if need be. It is in
the spirit and the promise of this hope for better things that I have defined
critical cultural law and economics. I remain confident that my efforts will,
in some season, prove fruitful.
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